Bilateral Pricing Research Of Communication Operators Based On Different Ownership Behaviors Of Consumers

Mobile and Unicom are typical bilateral platforms.Compared with the unilateral market,the bilateral market has its unique characteristics.Among them,the network externality and multi-homing between bilateral users are the most significant.As China's communications industry enters the oligopoly from monopoly,the attribution behavior of users entering the network has changed.Therefore,based on the unique characteristics of the bilateral market theory and the communication operator platform,this paper analyzes the impact of the change of consumer attribution behavior on the platform's bilateral pricing strategy,and provides theoretical guidance for price competition of bilateral platforms such as communication operators.In this paper,the pricing game model of two communication operators' bilateral platforms is established under the two strategies of simultaneous pricing and sequential pricing.By comparing the(refined)Nash equilibrium under the two game models,the network externalities between bilateral users are analyzed.The impact of multi-attribute behavior on the bilateral pricing and optimal profit of the platform.The research shows that:(1)When both users are single-homed,the optimal pricing and optimal profit of the two platforms for sequential decision-making are higher than the decision-making of the platform under the simultaneous decision-making.(2)If some multi-homing behavior occurs in consumers,regardless of the extent of inter-group network externality between users,the optimal pricing of the platform for consumers is consistent under both pricing orders,but it will have different effects on the pricing decisions of seller users.(3)When the externality of the inter-group network between the bilateral users is weak,the optimal pricing of the platform for the sellers under the sequential decision-making and the optimal profit that the platform can obtain are higher than the pricing of the sellers at the same time.Otherwise the conclusion is reversed.(4)Regardless of whether the competitive platform chooses simultaneous pricing or sequential pricing,some of the consumer's multi-homing behaviors reduce the maximum profit that the platform can obtain;and the two network externalities between consumers will promote the generation of multi-homing behavior.But the cost of learning that consumers need to enter the platform can weaken its multi-attribute behavior.