Research On The Relationship Between The Management Incentive And Enterprise Tax Avoidance

Management incentive mechanism is an important part of modern corporate governance structure.Under the situations of separation between ownership and managerial right,the shareholders seek to maximize the enterprise value,but management seek to maximize their own interests,which makes the management goals not identify with the interests of the shareholders and prevent to realize the goal of maximizing the wealth of shareholders.Existing research has shown conflict of interest between owners and operators affect s the tax avoidance of the enterprises with the emergence of the modern enterprise system of the separation of ownership and managerial authority.Tax avoidance is a common phenomenon all over the world,in order to obtain profits from tax avoidance,shareholders may provide managers with higher amount of incentive payments.As the management incentive of reducing agent cost and inspiring management to work hard,more and more scholars concern whether management incentive can stimulate the enterprise managers to make tax decisions to increase after-tax income.In the thesis,the domestic and foreign existing literature research is reviewed,and the idea and framework were sorted out.Then the thesis lists the concepts and basic theories and reveals the theoretical logic of management incentive and enterprise tax avoidance activities.Subsequently,eight hypotheses about the relationship between the management incentive and enterprise tax avoidance activities are put forward,then the design of the variables and model construction are completed.In the research design process,the thesis makes a regression test to the total sample,and analyzes the influence of management incentive to the enterprise tax avoidance.Moreover,compared with foreign private property rights,C hina has state-owned holding listed companies and non-state-owned holding listed companies,and the proportion of state-owned holding listed companies is larger.Differences between ownership types make the company management make different decisions for corporate tax avoidance.The thesis adds the dummy variable measuring ownership type in the model to inspect whether there are differences among the influences of management incentive to the enterprise tax avoidance in different ownership types.The research shows that there is a positive correlation relationship between executive compensation incentive and enterprise tax avoidance,and negative correlation relationship between pay gap and enterprise tax avoidance,especially in private-owned companies.There is a negative correlation relationship between perquisite consumption and enterprise tax avoidance,especially for state-owned companies.There is a positive correlation relationship between stock option incentive and enterprise tax avoidance,but there are not significant differences between both companies.Through the research,the thesis enriches the theory about tax avoidance and help to put forward policy suggestions for improving tax collection system in our country.