Research On The Relationship Between The Management Incentive And Enterprise Tax Avoidance

With the continuous development of the modern enterprise system,the separation of the two powers has led to the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the management.The interest conflict triggered by this relationship has affected the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises to a certain extent.The management stock incentive,as a tool that can make the management and the owner's interest converge,will undoubtedly have a certain influence on the enterprise tax avoidance.Therefore,in the model of modern corporate governance,the relevance between equity incentive and tax avoidance has become a hot spot and focus of scholars at home and abroad.The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between the managerial ownership incentive and the enterprise tax avoidance behavior from two aspects of normative analysis and empirical analysis.By drawing on existing research results at home and abroad,starting with the theory of normative analysis of equity incentive effect on tax evasion;secondly,to establish the regression model of management equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance,using our financial panel data of 2012-2016 years,the use of empirical way to test the management equity incentive effect on corporate tax avoidance degree;finally,according to the expected utility theory,introduce the tax supervision variables,analyze whether different tax supervision will change the influence,and accordingly for tax collection and administration department to provide certain reference.This study found that the executive equity incentive corporate tax avoidance behavior of financial industry have a significant positive impact,the risk that the owner for managers to provide incentives for more tax avoidance behavior of enterprises is more;and there is a negative correlation between corporate tax avoidance cross variable and financial industry executives of the level of equity incentive and supervision of tax authorities that is,the supervision of tax authorities can effectively restrain the equity incentive effects on the behavior of tax avoidance.Based on the conclusion,we believe that by implementing the risk reward mode of equity incentive,the interests of owners and managers will converge,and at the same time,they can stimulate executives to take a more radical tax avoidance strategy to reduce corporate tax burden.However,under the strict level of supervision,the effect of equity incentive is discounted.Therefore,in order to reduce the degree of tax avoidance,the government plays a decisive role.