Research On Engineering Supervisors' Incentive And Supervision Based On Game Model

Engineering supervision system is a new system introduced in China in the last century in 80 s,mainly aimed at some inside and outside the actual situations such as solving the construction supervision of China's construction industry is not in place,meeting the requirements of high quality from foreign enterprises and so on.Engineering supervision is an important measure for engineering construction industry in China to integrate with the international market.Engineering supervision system has been applied in China for nearly 40 years,and has achieved rich results,but it also exposed some defects and problems,such as project supervision can not be conscientious,and some conspiracy with project manager and so on.In spite of the fact that it has made the expressly prohibitive provisions about the collusion problem in project engineering in many central laws and documents such as "People's Republic of China tendering and Bidding Law" and "Regulations for the implementation of People's Republic of China tendering and Bidding Law" promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council,it is common for project supervisors and project managers to conspire against the interests of the employer and to reduce the quality of the work.How to effectively motivate the supervisor to play an effective role,to reduce the collusion in the field of supervision,to curb the occurrence of the project manager's misconduct is a serious problem to be solved urgently.At present,the employers protect their own interests mainly through establishing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism to regulate the the behavior of project managers and third-party supervisor-project supervision.Although there have been many forms of compensation for the project manager in recent years,for the supervision,China is still use the 2007 "construction supervision and related service charges" in the relevant formula for calculation,in other words,for the supervisors,the acquisition is based on the fixed supervision rate calculated from the fixed compensation when the project budgetary estimate is established.Practice has proved that the existing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism did not play a good role,in other words,the existing incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism is flawed.This paper aims at the problems in engineering supervision to establish the three party game model which is based on the principal agent theory and the influence of market reputation between project manager,supervisor and employer in the field of engineering construction.Based on the model,the paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship and the mixed strategy equilibrium solution ofthe project manager,the supervisor and the contractor under the fixed supervision rate system.Through the analysis of the optimal behavior choice of the parties,the paper puts forward the corresponding conclusion and the collusion prevention suggestion,and puts forward reasonable and concrete project supervision inspiration,supervision opinion and improvement measure on the basis of theoretical research.