Font Size: a A A

The Study Of Cooperation Incentive Mechanism On Reputation-Based Investment In Spatial Public Goods Game

Posted on:2018-01-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L CaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330515962865Subject:Software engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
At the age of the Internet with social networking,e-commerce flourishing,people began to rely more on using the Internet as the main way of daily interactions,so that the problem of security is becoming more and more serious during the process of interaction,and how to build a harmonious and mutual social environment is particularly important.Individuals are rational and selfish enough in complex network and they pay more attention on their own interests rather than group's.Encouraging cooperation among selfish individuals is crucial in many real-world systems,where individuals' collective behaviors can be analyzed using evolutionary public goods game.Along this line,extensive studies have shown that reputation is an effective mechanism to investigate the evolution of cooperation.In most existing studies,participating individuals in a public goods game are assumed to contribute unconditionally into the public pool,or they can choose partners based on a common reputation standard(e.g.,preference characters).However,to assign one reputation standard for all individuals is impractical in many real-world deployment and many more realistic situation have to be studied in depth.In this paper,we introduce a reputation tolerance mechanism that allows an individual to select its potential partners and decide whether or not to contribute an investment to the public pool based on its tolerance to other individuals' reputation.Specifically,an individual takes part in a public goods game only if the number of participants with higher reputation exceeds the value of its tolerance.Moreover,in this paper,an individual's reputation can increase or decrease in a bounded interval based on its historical behaviors.This paper explores the principle that how the reputation tolerance and conditional investment mechanisms can affect the evolution of cooperation in spatial lattice networks.The simulation results demonstrate that a larger tolerance value can achieve an environment that promote the cooperation of participants.Meanwhile,considering the limit of global reputation tolerance,this paper put forward a kind of reputation based heterogeneous investment model in public goods game in order to better simulate the reality of social network and the law of evolutionary cooperation.By studying evolution dynamics of cooperation in space lattice network,experiments show that different reputation tolerance corresponds to different effect of evolutionary cooperation under the environment of different parameters.
Keywords/Search Tags:Complex Networks, Indirect Reciprocity, Heterogeneous Investment, Reputation, Cooperation
PDF Full Text Request
Related items