Actuality And Effcetstudy On Equityincentivecarried Out Bystate-owned Holding Listed Companies

The problem of principal-agent is generated by the separation of ownership and control in modern enterprise.The state-owned holding listed companies occupied the important status in Chinese economy,while the serious principal-agent problem and lack of effective long-term incentive constraint mechanism,hindered the development of companies.Equity incentive was one of the effective ways to solve this problem.This system has been developed widely in western countries,while in China it was later.In Sep.2006,the trial measures for the implementation of equity incentive to the state-owned holding listed companies(domestic),was enacted,meaning that this way was widely used gradually by the state-owned holding listed companies.While,there were many internal problems such as governance structure defects,executive appointment system and so on,making design and implementation of the incentive scheme were easily controlled by management,leading to the problems of ethical risk,unfair distribution.So whether great effect would be obtained or not,became the focus of the government and academia.In such a background,this paper analyzed that was the current situation of equity incentive carried out by the state-owned holding listed companies and what effect would be obtained and there was a strong theoretical and practical significance to study these problems.Based on the existing literature,this paper firstly illustrated the related notions theoretical foundations of equity incentive,and revealed that why the state-owned holding listed companies would carry out the equity incentive;then,the overall implementation situation of the incentive scheme by the state-owned holding listed companies was summarized and described,the factors of equity incentive were analyzed and compared with the non-state-owned listed companies;the method of empirical analysis was used to study the equity incentive effect from the perspective of the company's performance,that was,taking the ratio as substitution variables to measure the level of equity incentive and return on equity as substitution variables of the performance,52 sets of equity incentive plan data of state-owned holding listed companies from 2011 to 2015 were obtained through strict screening.In order to conduct comparative analysis,other 261 sets of data of non-state-owned listed companies were also found.In order to validate the influence of different incentive modes acting on incentive effects,variance analysis was applied.Finally,the existing problems in the implementation of equity incentive by the state-owned holding listed companies were summarized and some suggestions were given in the last section of this paper.It was found that for state-owned listed companies,there were some characteristics such as scattered industry distribution of equity incentive,low incentive proportion,relatively single incentive model,concentrated selection mode of stock source and the shorter validity period,etc.Through the empirical analysis,this paper found that,for state-owned holding listed companies,the level of equity:incentive was negatively correlated with the performance,but not significant;while it was positive correlation for non-state-owned listed conpanies,and not significant as well.In the aspect of the influence of d:ifferent incentive modes acting on incentive effects,there were no significant differences between stock options and restricted stock.The reason of this phenomenon was the internal and external environments were not conducive to the effect performance of equity incentive.So,in order to improve the implement present situation of institution in the state-owned hold:ing listed companies,a company governance structure should be optimized,a competitive professional manager market should be established,an effective capital market should be nurtured,and the sound policies and regulations on equity incentive should be carried out.And on the design of the equity incentive plan,as the selection of incentive mode had little impact on their performance,some flexible and suitable choices on incentive mode could be made combined the internal and external environments for the companies.