Research On The Relationship Between Executive Stock Ownership And Corporate Investment Behavior Of Chinese Listed Companies

Investment is one of the important driving forces of economic growth.According to the relevant data of China Statistical Yearbook,the contribution rate of investment to economic growth has reached an average of 46.9% between 2011 and 2015.As an important part of the social investment,the appropriation of corporate investment not only is significant for the survival and development of the corporate itself,but also determines the trend of macroeconomic.The separation of the ownership and management right of the modern corporate system,while supporting the rapid development of corporate,also derived the principal-agent problem.The agent's self-interest behavior has worsened the process of corporate investment making decision,reduced the sensitivity of investment opportunities and distorted the investment level of corporate.In order to take into account the interests of principals and agents,to reduce the negative impact on corporate investment decisions,in practice,some companies implemented executive holdings plan.In order to test the effect of executive holding plan on the performance of investment behavior,this paper takes Chinese listed companies as an example to study the relationship between executive holding and enterprise investment behavior.The paper is composed of five parts,the first part is the introduction,summarizes the research background and research significance,the research ideas and the overall research framework,determine the research methods and the innovation of the article.The second part is the theoretical review,introduced the principal-agent theory,insider control theory,incentive theory,and domestic and foreign research on this problem.The three classical theories point out the reasons for the distortion of the investment behavior and support the theoretical help for the proposed solution.The third part is the research design.Firstly,the content of the article is clearly defined.Then,the research hypothesis is put forward according to the theoretical analysis.Finally,the sample data is selected and the design of the research model and the measurement of the relevant variables are pointed out.The fourth part is more important,is the analysis of the empirical results of the article,first of all listed companies listed on the motherboard as a sample to determine the main empirical research variables,designed to meet the executive holdings and corporate investment behavior of the empirical model;and then data regression analysis,The regression of all the samples to test whether the executive holdings influence corporate investment behavior,the second is the sample data is divided into state-owned and non-state two groups to test whether the nature of equity will infuluence investment behavior when executive incentives(holdings)and,the third introduces equity structure factors to analyze the relationship between executive incentive(holding)and investment behavior adjustment.Empirical analysis shows that the holdings of executives can improve the level of investment,inhibit the sensitivity of corporate investment opportunities.The results between the different situations,there are different relationships: from the nature of equity,the impact of executive holdings on corporate investment behavior deviation,the investment level of the non-state-owned enterprises have a positive impact and negative impact on the investment sensitivity,.From the perspective of ownership structure,the incentive role of executive holdings is also different.The highly concentrated or moderately concentrated enterprises will have a negative influence,but on the highly diversified firms they will not be significant from the investment sensitivity aspect,the impact on a high concentration of equity is significant,that although the holdings of executives have the power to expand investment but the decision to be more cautious and conservative;on the moderate concentration of equity companies are positive but not significant;The impact on highly diversified equity is significant from negative to positive.The fifth part,as a summary,mainly introduces the research conclusions and put forward the policy recommendations according to the conclusions,also put forward the shortcomings of the paper and the work need to do next step.According to the research conclusion,this paper puts forward the following suggestions: First,strictly regulate and improve the information disclosure system,the second is to expand the scope of equity incentive,the third is to strengthen the internal audit management of investment projects,the fourth is to optimize the ownership structure of enterprises.