Social Security Fund's Shareholding ?Agency Costs And Executive Compensation

The Social Security Fund is China's social security reserve fund,which is used to supplement and adjust the social security expenditures such as pension insurance during the peak period of population aging.In order to achieve the goal of maintaining and increasing value,the social security fund is involved in corporate governance,and the supervision of the executive compensation system is the participation of the social security fund.An important way of corporate governance.Therefore,this paper has a certain significance to study the impact of social security funds on senior management from the micro level of listed company governance.By studying the impact of the external large shareholders of social security funds on the executive compensation of listed companies,we can analyze the role of social security funds in the governance of listed companies,grasp the impact of social security funds on executive compensation,and provide practical practice for social security funds to participate in the governance of listed companies.Reference;social security fund has a professional management team,advanced management experience,listed companies can learn from and improve the salary incentive structure.Listed companies with good performance can be favored by listed companies,which can promote listed companies to actively improve the compensation system,improve management efforts,improve company performance,and attract social security fund investment.The issue of principal-agent between shareholders and management and the agency problem between large shareholders and small and medium-sized shareholders is one of the core issues that modern corporate governance needs to address.The research in this paper is helpful to explore whether the implementation of the social security fund system can alleviate the agency problems of listed companies,improve governance efficiency,and achieve expected goals.This will provide evidence support for the implementation of the social security fund system and the gradual relaxation of policy restrictions in the future.Based on the theory of principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the impact of social security fund holdings on two types of agency costs and executive compensation of listed companies,and the role of two types of agency costs in the process of social security funds affecting executive compensation of listed companies;Analyze the corresponding research hypothesis,and construct the empirical regression model of the social security fund shareholding characteristics(the social security fund shareholding ratio,the social securityfund shareholding duration,the social security fund balance degree)on the executive compensation,the social security fund shareholding ratio to the two types of agents The empirical regression model of cost impact and the mediating role model of two types of agency costs;using the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in2007-2017,the statistical model of the research model was tested by stata.14 statistical software.The research shows that the executive compensation of listed companies with social security funds is better than that of listed companies without social security funds;the proportion of shares held by social security funds,the duration of shares held by social security funds,the balance of social security funds and the sensitivity of executive compensation performance Significant positive correlation;the shareholding ratio of social security funds is significantly negatively correlated with the cost of two types of agency.The social security fund actively intervenes in corporate governance and reduces the cost of two types of agency;the two types of agency costs play a role in the process of social security funds affecting executive compensation of listed companies.Part of the intermediary role.These empirical results show that the social security fund participates in the governance of listed companies and plays an active role in governance,alleviating the agency problems between shareholders and management and major shareholders and minority shareholders,and promoting listed companies to improve their compensation mechanisms and improve governance efficiency.These conclusions also provide evidence support for the future government to implement the social security fund system and gradually relax the policy restrictions,so that the social security fund can play a better role in the Chinese capital market.