An Empirical Study On The Effect Of Executive Stock Option Incentive On The Performance Of Listed Companies

At present,China's market is gradually open,and some international companies and products have also entered China,the company is facing increasingly fierce market competition,some companies have been eliminated by the market.Executives play a very important role in promoting the company's development,improving the company's performance and enhancing the company's competitiveness.Therefore,excellent executives are valued by more and more companies.However,because of the principal-agent problem,some executives receive generous annual salary,but for their own selfish interests,or "work without effort."".How to motivate executives to play a better role,but also to reduce the cost of supervision,more and more companies have chosen to implement the equity incentive system.Does executive stock ownership incentive system increase the company's performance significantly? Some researchers at home and abroad have explored the subject.However,because of their different times,and the sample selection,executive incentive program,the company's performance indicators are different,so the conclusions obtained are not the same.In order to explore this problem,this article uses the literature citation method and the empirical analysis method.The article collects some related literatures at home and abroad,and classifies and summarizes the research of equity incentive system by researchers both at home and abroad.Prior to the results of researchers,pioneering thinking,access to their own research perspective.The article selects the relevant theories of researchers at home and abroad,and combined with the current situation of China's equity incentive system,so that readers have a general understanding.In addition,this paper chooses 42 companies in2012 the implementation of equity incentive as a sample,and selected the-2015 financial data of these companies in 2009,through the panel data collection model,through the regression analysis results: detection probability proportional to rate of return on net assets and net assets per share and equity are greater than 0.05,and come to the conclusion: equity incentive and corporate performance have not significant correlation.Then,this paper selects the case of Luzhou stock exchange to implement equity incentive,which shows that some companies do not promote the performance of the company if they implement the equity incentive system.Finally,based on the conclusion,this paper analyzes the reasons for the invalidation of the equity incentive system and gives some relevant suggestions.This article has the following parts: the first chapter is the introduction,introduces the equity incentive research background and the research significance,introduces the domestic and foreign researchers on the function of equity incentive and corporate performance,and the correlation research.The second chapter expounds the theory of equity incentive and the current situation of development.The definition and related theories of equity incentive are introduced in detail.The development process and current situation of equity incentive system in China are introduced,and the existing problems of the equity incentive system are introduced.The third chapter is the empirical study of the impact of equity incentive on corporate performance.This article uses the multiple linear model to analyze the relationship between the two.Finally draws the conclusion.The fourth chapter is a case study of executive incentives-Luzhou equity incentive.The article first introduces the status of the two implementation of equity incentive by Luzhou Laojiao Corporation,and then analyzes the reasons for the implementation of the incentive plan,and introduces the specific operation measures of the equity incentive of Luzhou Laojiao company.The fifth chapter is the reason and suggestion of the conclusion.From the impact of executives on the performance of the company,the incomplete capital market,the quota of equity incentive,the performance appraisal system is not perfect and supervision,the reasons why equity incentive has not reached the incentive effect have been explored.And some suggestions were put forward from these aspects:strengthening the construction of fully effective securities market;the construction of effective incentive system;construction objective,to meet the company's actual operating conditions and needs of the executive performance appraisal system;improving the management of the company,to build a good supervision mechanism,inspectors on executive behavior.I hope that some of the recommendations of the article can provide some reference to the current management of the company.