Regulation Bias And Attribution Analysis Of Product Quality Supervision

Quality and safety are the cause and effect of each other,quality is the basis of safety work,safety is the bottom line of quality work.The impartiality of sample selection of product quality supervision and inspection is an important measure of the effectiveness of product quality supervision system.From the point of view of regulation bias of product quality supervision and sampling,this paper analyzes the current situation,effect and deficiency of product quality supervision,and puts forward some feasible suggestions based on the empirical results.Product quality supervision and inspection are the most direct way for the government to perform the function of quality supervision.Government quality supervision can indirectly affect the production behavior and consumer behavior through changing the allocation of market resources.In order to reduce the security risk,the quality supervision of our country is guided by the principle of quality center,the principle of safety bottom line and the principle of technical means.Based on the analysis of the current quality supervision system in developed countries,it is found that the quality supervision system in developed countries can be used for reference:Firstly,the emphasis on the quality and safety of the government and the development of quality management.Secondly,government quality regulation plays an important role in the economic development of these countries and regions.Thirdly,the formation of a common management model,the government,the market and society to play a common role in the quality of supervision and management.China’s supervision and inspection focus on the existence of security risks,therefore,the main purpose of the implementation of China’s product quality supervision and inspection system is to reduce security risks.The difference of enterprises’ scale and industry supervision bias have institutional basis.The existing research lacks empirical evidence based on firm level survey data,and seldom analyzes the policy performance of quality supervision from the perspective of industry differences.Based on the first-hand survey data,this paper studies the justice of the quality supervision and the policy performance from the perspective of industry differences.This dissertation studies the industry difference and policy performance of product quality supervision based on China Employer-Employee Survey.The survey results and basic conclusions show that the industry bias of product quality supervision does exist.The probability of manufactures being supervised in key industry is significantly higher than that of non-key industry.Further study also shows that there is no obvious correlation between product quality and possibility of supervision inspection.Furthermore,based on the analysis of the interaction between firm size,whether it is state-owned enterprise,whether it is a foreign enterprise or whether it is a high-tech enterprise,several conclusions can be drawn as follows:enterprises belonging to key industries,smaller enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises,domestic enterprises,non-high-tech enterprises are more likely to be inspected.Based on the theoretical analysis,the possible reasons for the above conclusions are analyzed.On the one hand,the non-state-owned enterprises,domestic enterprises are more likely to be inspected,this may be due to duties convenience of government departments.In the process of fulfilling their functions of management and service of government departments,it’s reasonable to save management costs and improve management efficiency.On the other hand,enterprises belonging to key industries,non-high-tech enterprises,smaller enterprises are more likely to be inspected,this may be based on the quality and safety considerations.The government departments need these external constraints through sampling to promote product quality.With the findings of the empirical evidence,the following recommendations to improve the effectiveness of quality supervision are made as:improve the "double random" supervision and inspection mechanism,construct "self-declaration of product quality" system,strengthen the main responsibility of enterprises,promote consumer sovereignty,build big data platform to promote signal transmission.