Research On The Relationship Between Management Power And Quality Of Information Disclosure

The quality of information disclosure will affect all aspects of the capital market.Good information disclosure can promote the healthy and vigorous development of the capital market,help investors make effective decisions,and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.But the present situation of information disclosure in China is not ideal.Because of the violation of information disclosure,the listed companies who have been punished by the CSRC have been found everywhere.In order to regulate the information disclosure behavior of listed companies and ensure the legitimate rights and interests of investors,the CSRC and the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges have issued various rules and regulations successively.But in order to ensure the quality of information disclosure has been improved,the effect of the corporate governance structure on the quality of information disclosure can not also be ignored,in addition to the corresponding standards established by the government and relevant institutions.However,most of the related literatures are analyzed from the characteristics of the board of directors,the characteristics of the board of supervisors and the structure of the shareholding structure,and very few take into account the management's use of the influence of the company to control the disclosure of information.When imperfect governance structure and absent supervision,the management may manipulate the information disclosure to achieve the goal of seeking personal gain,which will lead to the quality of information disclosure.Therefore this article has certain significance.The theoretical significance is to broaden the scope of information disclosure of the factors affecting the quality,but also to expand the application field of managerial power theory;The practical significance lies in the rational allocation of various managerial powers,and provides a reference for the excessive management power dimension that has a negative effect on the quality of information disclosure.The main content of this paper is based on theoretical analysis,empirical research and conclusions.The first is literature review,and it's mainly about to measurement of managerial power and information disclosure quality,factors affecting the quality of information disclosure,and the relationship between management power and quality of information disclosure.Secondly,it defines the key terms such as management,management power,information disclosure quality and so on,and analyzes the influence of management power on the quality of information disclosure based on the principalagent theory,which lays a solid theoretical foundation for the study of this paper.Furthermore,it puts forward a few hypotheses about the relationship between mana-gement power and the quality of information disclosure on the basis of previous studies.It measures the explanatory variable using the information disclosure rating scale of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,and it uses the two positions,whether or not to hold shares,whether or not to have senior titles,and whether or not to exceed the industry median to investigate the management power.It also select the concentration control variables such as firm size,proportion of independent directors and equity.After using Excel to collect data for screening and using SPSS19.0 for descriptive statistics andcorrelation test of the variables,it examines the relationship of management power and information disclosure quality through the establishment of the two yuan logistic regression empirical model for analysis.Finally,according to the empirical results,it summarizes the conclusions of this study combined with the corresponding theory.It puts forward relevant policy suggestions and analyzes the lack of the research process in this paper and points out that can be improved in the future research aspects.The results of this study show that:(1)the Shenzhen A shares listed on the quality of information disclosure in recent years to maintain the basic stability,but also greatly enhance the potential;(2)the state-owned listed companies compared to non state-owned listed companies,better the quality of information disclosure;(3)the management organization will reduce power the quality of information disclosure,and the ownership power,expert power and prestige power can improve the quality of information disclosure;(4)the size of the company to the quality of information disclosure has significant positive effects,although the ownership concentration and the rate of return on total assets can also promote the improvement of information disclosure,but the effect is not obvious,while the proportion of independent directors,asset liability ratio is negatively correlated with the quality of information disclosure,the correlation is very significant.According to the empirical conclusions,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions,such as improving the information disclosure system,constructing the evaluation system of information disclosure,improving the corporate governance mechanism,and rationally developing the various powers of the management.