The Relevance Of Food Quality And Safety Information Disclosure And Enterprise Value

The Chinese economy has entered a new normal of upgrading and enhancing efficiency after 40 years of rapid growth.At the same time,food consumption is also shifting from subsistence consumption to health and enjoyment consumption,shifting from pursuit of "quantity" to emphasis on "quality".However,in recent years,the food industry has witnessed many food quality and safety incidents(such as "melamine"," poisonous pickle ","clenbuterol" and "waste oil")that have posed serious threats to the general public's health and even lives-threatening.As a result,the food enterprises and even the entire food industry have been caught in a crisis of confidence.The crisis of confidence arises not only from the existing problems of food quality itself,but also from the magnifying effect of the asymmetry of food quality and safety information.Specifically,food manufacturers and food consumers due to different levels of food quality and safety information will inevitably lead to the information gap between the two,namely,the informational advantages of food enterprises and the informational disadvantages of food consumers.Moreover,this gap in food quality and safety information often deepens as the food supply chain extends,exacerbating the extent of such information asymmetry.Of course,consumers are rational,and they tend to deduce the quality and safety of their food through this level of information asymmetry.Therefore,in order to obtain the confidence of consumers,enhance the confidence of food consumption and realize their own sustainable development,food enterprises must improve the quality of food at the same time disclose more food quality and safety information to reduce the degree of asymmetry of information.In this paper,we take A-share food listed companies which are over the period of 2012 to 2016 in shenzhen and shanghai as the research objects.This study used descriptive statistics,principal component factor analysis,multiple regression analysis,instrumental variable method and Stata14.0 statistical software.To measure the disclosure of food quality and safety information,we set up a comprehensive index system with the three aspects,including ensuring food quality and safety,ensuring the disclosure of food quality and safety information and customer responsibility.We focus on the relationship between the disclosure of food quality and safety information and the value of the enterprise.The relationship between the disclosure of food quality and safety information and the value of the enterprise under different levels of corporate governance and different shareholdings is further discussed.Based on this,when we choose investor confidence and inefficient investment as an intermediary factor,we want to make a broaden analysis on the relationship between the disclosure of food quality and safety information and the value of the enterprise.We aim at deepening the economic consequences of information disclosure of food quality and safety research and providing policy recommendations which are in favor of the regulation of information disclosure mechanism.This will not only guide food companies to formally disclose food quality and safety information,but also enhance enterprise value.Through the above theoretical analysis and empirical research,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)the disclosure of food quality and safety information has a significant positive impact on enterprise value in current and lagged Phase I and II;(2)the disclosure of food quality and safety information has a more significant effect on the value of the enterprise in food enterprises with the low level of corporate governance;(3)compared with state-owned food enterprises,the disclosure of food quality and safety information has a more significant impact on the value of non-state-owned food enterprises.(4)investor's confidence plays the role of bridge in the relationship between the disclosure of food quality and safety information and the value of the enterprise;(5)there is no intermediary effect of inefficient investment on the relationship between the disclosure of food quality and safety information and the value of the enterprise.