A Study On The Relationship Between Executive Characteristics And Innovation Performance Of Chinese Overseas Investment Enterprises Under The Institutional Duality

With the rapid development of economic globalization, more and more enterprises in developing countries invest overseas directly to gain sustainable competitiveness in a large market. Notably, the development rate of the investment abroad of emerging economies' enterprises is catching up with and surpass developed countries'. In particular, Chinese enterprises overseas investment is entering the accelerated stage, China has become the focus of global multinational enterprises to investment. As the issue and chief executive of the investment strategy decision of the overseas investment enterprises, the managers' concept and behavior play a key role in the development of enterprises. And they are the most important resource of the enterprises. Their demographic characteristics, especially the characteristics of power incentives in corporate governance, will have an important impact on corporate innovation and external risk perception preferences. And then affect their behavior and enterprise innovation performance. In view of the current changes and challenges faced by Chinese enterprises overseas investment. That is,there is an urgent need for overseas innovation and they must face a high degree of innovation risk in a multinational environment at the same time. Therefore,in the new period of transformation and upgrading of Chinese manufacturing enterprises to go out. It has great practical significance and academic value to explore the relationship between the executive power and the performance of overseas innovation.Based on the above theoretical ideas, this paper takes the manufacturing overseas investment enterprises in China from 2001 to 2013 of Shanghai and Shenzhen A share market as samples .And we draw on the experiences of the related principle of organizational control theory, with the overseas investment enterprises in China's listed companies as the object. We let the home country political association in enterprise innovation decisions as an important innovation power of the executive and the host country institutional environment as the key risk consciousness of executives, to examine their regulation effects between overseas innovation performance of enterprise and managerial power allocation by empirical test. And focus on revealing the significant differences between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises at the above-mentioned problems. Based on the empirical comparison of different ownership enterprises, this paper studies the relationship between executive power and corporate overseas innovation performance under the institutional duality. The main findings are as follows:First, whether state-owned or private enterprises, board monitoring and executive tenure are significantly negatively correlated with corporate overseas innovation performance. Compared with state-owned enterprises, the two duties of executives have a more significant negative impact on private enterprises' overseas innovation performance. The human capital pricing function of executive salary and the managerial entrenchment effect of equity ratio play a more significant positive and negative impact on private enterprises' overseas innovation performance respectively.Second, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the home country political association of private enterprises plays a more significant role on the board of directors, two part-time and overseas innovation performance. Among them, the supervision of the board of directors will be increased caused by the strengthening effect of executive power in the home country political association, it's not conducive to the enterprise overseas innovation performance. The adverse effects on overseas innovation performance of enterprises caused by management defensive effect caused by two part-time are reverse regulated positively by the home country political association. Compared with private enterprises, the adverse effects on the overseas innovation performance of enterprises caused by executive re-election of state-owned enterprises are reverse regulated more significant by the home country political association.Third, whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, the perfection of host country system plays a significant regulation role in board regulation, annual salary and overseas innovation performance. Among them, the adverse effects on overseas innovation performance of enterprises caused by power constraint effect of board monitoring are strengthened by the perfection of host country system. The beneficial effects of human capital pricing function of executive salary on the performance of overseas innovation are positively influenced by the perfection of host country system. Compared with private enterprises, the adverse effects of the re election of the state-owned enterprises on the overseas innovation performance of enterprises will be more significant caused by the reverse regulation of innovation support effect of the perfection of the host country system and environment.