The Relative Decentralization Of Shares,Control Contests And Enterprise Value

In recent years,with the rise of mergers and acquisitions,mergers and acquisitions in the securities industry are raging in full swing.When choosing merger targets,firms tend to choose firms with core competitive advantage or strong integration ability in order to make up for the defects and achieve the integration effect of "1+1>2".But not every acquisition can go well and achieve the desired effect,because they may encounter a variety of circumstances in mergers and acquisitions process.For example,in the process of mergers and acquisitions,the company will introduce new shareholders,then it is very likely to change the ownership structure of the company,and will make the further control of the company changed.So it will lead to a battle for control between big shareholders and new shareholders.The case selected in this paper is about the battle of Founder Securities control rights,which describes the acquisition process of Founder Securities and National securities.The first largest shareholder and the second largest shareholder formed a relative control situation,leading to a dispute over the control power between the two sides.As the first case of market mergers and acquisitions in securities industry,the merger should have increased the size of the company,assets,sales and business revenue,but it has caused some problems.The competition for control rights caused some thoughts about the relationship between the relative dispersion of shares and the competition for control rights and the impact of control power on enterprise value.In this paper,the method of single case analysis is adopted.Based on the review of relevant literature research,I take the control contest of Founder Securities as the object of study.Firstly,this paper analyzes the changes of ownership structure and explores the relationship between this change and the competition for control rights after describing the cause,process,and outcome of the securities merger and acquisition of the national security and the battle for control after the acquisition.Secondly,through the description of the battle for control,I found the discovery of board elections is the main way of fighting for control.Thirdly,from the two aspects of market effect and financial performance,I deeply explore the impact of the competition on the corporate value of the Founder Securities control.Finally,the study finds that the competition for control makes the stock price fall,financial performance decline,reputation damaged,andthe board election chaotic,so it explains the relatively dispersed ownership leads to the Founder Securities control contest and has a bad influence on the company.Many domestic mathematicians point out that in terms of the current situation of Listed Companies in China,there is a great deal of defects in the concentration of shares,but several large shareholders can play the role of mutual restraint,improve corporate governance,and enhance the enterprise value.At present,there is no unified conclusion about the influence of control power on enterprise value,some scholars believe that control contest can enhance the corporate value,and others think that control contest can lead to the decline of enterprise value.However,this article finds that this relatively decentralized ownership structure is not stable,and it leads to compete for control.During this period,the big shareholders fought for control and destroyed the value of the company's securities.So through the case studies,this paper thinks that the relatively dispersed ownership structure is unstable,which will easily lead to the fight for control rights,and this control contest will damage the value of the enterprise.At the same time,I hope that I can provide some information for the follow-up scholars on the fight for control.