Font Size: a A A

The Study On Game Behavior Of Minority Shareholders In Tunneling Of Large Shareholders

Posted on:2018-11-28Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W J FengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330518964796Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
There are differences between the control rights of large shareholders and cash flow rights,the motives of large shareholders are tunneling listed companies,and the interests of minority shareholders are at risk of being infringed.The institutional background of "one dominant"ownership structure,imperfect corporate governance mechanism and inadequate protection of the interests of minority shareholders provides the objective conditions for the larger shareholders to tunneling the listed companies.In the face of large shareholders of tunneling behavior,how to deal with minority shareholders,how to protect their own interests worthy of consideration.This paper divides the game between minority shareholders and large shareholders into four stages:the first stage,the minority shareholders to monitor the behavior of large shareholders.The second stage,minority shareholders in the shareholder meeting against the larger shareholders of the occupation decision-making.The third stage,minority shareholders on behalf of the large shareholder appeal.The fourth stage,minority shareholders to sell shares of listed companies.The paper is divided into five chapters.The second chapter is the theoretical foundation,the concept definition and the literature review,is the foundation of the further research;The third chapter analyzes the minority shareholders and the minority stockholder's rights and interests;The conflict between the interests of the large shareholders and the division of the four stages of the game in the process of large shareholders tunneling,the game model to build and solve the specific game behavior analysis;Chapter IV ST biochemical as an example of minority shareholders and large shareholders Chapter 5 is the revelation and prospect,and puts forward some suggestions to strengthen the supervision of listed companies,increase the cost of large shareholders,optimize the company's corporate governance structure,reduce the chance of large shareholders 'occupation and improve the protection mechanism of minority shareholders' interests.Legal system and other large shareholders tunneling the proposed conduct of governance.Finally,the shortcomings of this study and future research prospects.
Keywords/Search Tags:large shareholders, minority shareholders, game, tunnel
PDF Full Text Request
Related items