The Study Of Executive Compensation Incentive Of State Holding Listed Companies In China Impact On Earnings Management

Under the background of the modern enterprise system, based on the earnings management of salary incentive get the long-term extensive attention from scholars both at home and abroad. This article selects the salary incentive there is a big controversy as the research object, and fully expounds the behavior of earnings management under the compensation contracts, explains the different forms of salary incentive for the role of the different ways of earnings management. It provides theory basis for the related regulators and investors decision, and strengthens the study of executive compensation incentive for impact of earnings management. This thesis studies our country state holding listed companies.This thesis selects 2011-2015, the Shanghai and Shenzhen main board a-share state holding listed companies as research samples. We get Accrued earnings management and Real earnings management by modified Jones model and Roychowdhury model, and take it as a measure of state holding listed company earnings management. Meanwhile, we study the executive incentive effect on the earnings management. The first chapter, we review and comb the existing literature at home and abroad, and confirm the view of research. The next chapter of this article defining the related concepts,including state-owned holding listed companies, executives incentives and earnings management. Using the three classical theory as the analysis tool,so as to find out the influence mechanism of executive incentive about Accrual earnings management and Real earnings management. The third chapter, we take the contract theory, principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory as the analysis tool, the hypothesis of thesis is put forward based on the related theoretical analysis. The fourth chapter, we select the sample data, define variable and build model, and analyze test. The fifth chapter, conclusions are got, and policy recommendations are given.The results showed that, there are both Accrued earnings and Real earnings in Earnings management of our country state holding listed company. However, compared with Real earnings management, the use of accrued earnings management performance level is much higher. Monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive are positively related with Accrued earnings management. However, Monetary compensation incentive is positively related with Real earnings management and equity incentive is negative correlation with Real earnings management. State holding listed company executives layer more inclined to use Accrued earnings management, so as to realize the purpose of accounting surplus manipulation.Finally, we give some suggestions, to establish the enterprise senior management performance evaluation index system, reasonable to optimize the structure of the enterprise senior management compensation contracts,strengthen the supervision and management of the enterprise internal mechanism.