An Impact Study Of The Corporate Governance On The Risk-taking Behavior For A-share Market Listed Banks

The U.S.subprime mortgage crisis evolved into the global financial crisis,which caused the M&A,governmental taking-over or falls into bankruptcy for a scale of banks.The banks' risk-taking problems also have been paid more attention by many scholars,bankers and governmental officers to the risk-taking problem.The banks' risk-taking level is the comprehensive result from various factors,like the effect of corporate governance,market discipline and government supervision.The internal mechanism of corporate governance influence the risk preference and behavior of banks' decision-making participants.The corporate governance of commercial banks has the close connection between the daily operation and the future prospect.There are many literature about the relationship between corporate governance and performance of enterprises,but only a few researches focus on the relationship between banks' corporate governance and their risk-taking level with empirical methods.Although some domestic scholars have began to transform the methods from qualitative to quantitative analysis in this direction,these studies are still in the primary stage because Chinese commercial banks have just completed the joint-stock reform in the short time,the mechanism of governance needs to be optimized in the current situations.Therefore,this paper takes 16 A-share market listed banks as the objects and explores the correlation between internal governance and risk-taking behavior,which contains the theoretical and practical significance.This paper based on some theories of corporate governance,corporate governance of commercial banks,risk preference and related literature reviews.The author selects the annual data of 16 banks from 2010 to 2016.It includes 4 state-owned holding banks,9 joint-stock commercial banks and 3 city commercial banks.The research hypothesis focus on the relationship between different governance elements and risk-taking behavior,and build a multiple regression model with the help of E-views software.The results show that the degree of ownership concentration,executive compensation,the proportion of independent directors,shareholders' right arrangement and the internal control of special committees remain the negative correlations with risk-taking level;the proportion of state-owned holding and the stock dividends was positively correlated with risk-taking level.other factors had no significant relationship with thedependent variable.On these grounds,this study gives relevant suggestions: maintain proper ownership concentration,strengthen the speciality of independent director,play the role of the board of supervisors and the special committee,improve the banks' executive compensation mechanism and protect the interests of small shareholders.