Research On The Influence Of The Control Power Allocation On The Stickiness Of Executive Compensation Of Manufacturing Industry Listed Corporation

With the continuous develop ment of modern enterprises,executive compensation contract mechanism seems to be a powerful medicine to solve the principal-agent theory.But in 2008 the domestic economy appears desolate,peace broke chairman will pay exorbitant salaries to public peak compensation contract mechanism widely questioned.This kind of compensation and performance change deviate from the phenomenon to a certain extent,indicating the failure of the compensation contract mechanism.The allocation of control rights is an important internal supervision mechanism,which can make up for the lack of contractual mechanism.Therefore,this paper selects the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies during the period of 2013-2015 as the sample,and constructs the multiple linear regression progressive model to study the influence of the allocation of control rights on executive compensation and executive compensation.First of all,on the basis of literature review,defines the related concepts of each variable system configuration and control the allocation of control rights of executive compensation stickness,and expounds the principal-agent theory,managerial power theory,property rights theory.Secondly,the basic analysis of the executive compensation and the allo cation of control rights.The manufacturing listed companies with each all companies,all other industries and manufacturing sub sectors executives salary comparison,reveal the manufacturing status of executive compensation;from the shareholders,the management,the board of directors of the three levels,six aspects of manufacturing listed companies control right allocation status.Thirdly,we construct a progressive multiple linear regression model to test the influence of the allocation of control rights on executive compensation and stickiness of executive compensation.From the three levels of shareholders,management and board of directors,combined with the six major variables to study the influence of the allocation of control rights on executive compensation.O n the basis of the regression results of the above model,we introduce the firm performance variables and virtual variable performance change to build a progressive model,and further explore the impact of the allocation of control on executive compensation stickiness.Finally,from the shareholders,management,the board of directors to optimize the allocation of control structure of three levels,on how to reduce the listed manufacturing company executives pay sticky recommendations.