| The world today is experiencing major changes not seen in a century,and China’s development is facing dual dilemmas at home and abroad.The international trend of anti globalization has intensified,and the technological blockade against China has increased.The traditional economic development model in China has become unsustainable,and the economic growth situation is not optimistic.In the new era of dual cycle development,accelerating technological innovation is the only way to enhance China’s technological and economic strength.Enterprises are the main body of innovation at the micro level,and improving their R&D and innovation capabilities is crucial for the growth of enterprise value and the enhancement of comprehensive national strength.R&D innovation decisions are mainly made by senior executives,but the existence of principal-agent conflicts makes senior executives generally have a negative attitude towards R&D innovation,which restricts the improvement of enterprise R&D investment levels and the creation of long-term value.A reasonable and effective incentive mechanism can enhance the enthusiasm of senior executives for R&D innovation,and promote the sustained growth of enterprise value.Salary incentives are an important way of motivating executives,but existing research suggests that standard and symmetrical performance based compensation contracts have significant limitations in motivating executives to make R&D innovation decisions,and there is no consensus on whether they can promote enterprise value.In recent years,executive compensation contracts with sticky characteristics have entered the research field of scholars.Unlike traditional performance-based compensation contracts,stickiness of executive compensation allows executives to receive high salary increases when enterprise performance rises,but to suffer less or even avoid salary cuts when enterprise performance declines.Previous studies have pointed out that stickiness of executive compensation reflects the tendency of salary makers to "tolerate failure,reward heavily,and punish lightly",and is a special type of executive incentive contract.So,as a new incentive method for senior executives,can stickiness of executive compensation enhance executives’ willingness to invest in research and development,promote enterprises to increase R&D investment,and thereby enhance enterprise value? This is the main issue to be explored in this article.Based on this,this article takes R&D investment as a starting point to study the impact of stickiness of executive compensation on enterprise value,and whether R&D investment plays a mediating role in it.In further research,it will deeply explore whether the mediating role of R&D investment is different among enterprises with different property rights,different technical characteristics,and different executive compensation stickiness intensities.The empirical results show that:(1)Stickiness of executive compensation has a significant positive impact on enterprise value;(2)Stickiness of executive compensation significantly promotes the increase of enterprise R&D investment;(3)R&D investment plays a partial intermediary role in the process of stickiness of executive compensation affecting enterprise value;(4)The research on distinguishing the nature of property rights found that the intermediary effect of R&D investment is more significant in non-state owned enterprises;(5)The research on distinguishing technology characteristics found that the intermediary effect of R&D investment is more significant in high-tech enterprises;(6)The research on distinguishing the intensity of stickiness of executive compensation found that in enterprises with weak stickiness of executive compensation,R&D investment is the intermediary variable that stickiness of executive compensation affects enterprise value,but in enterprises with strong stickiness of executive compensation,the positive impact of stickiness of executive compensation on enterprise value and R&D investment is not significant,and excessive stickiness of executive compensation cannot play an effective incentive role.Compared to previous literature,this article creatively studies the economic consequences of stickiness of executive compensation from the perspective of enterprise value,and explores the mechanism from the perspective of R&D investment,which has certain implications for enterprises to enhance their awareness of technological innovation and optimize executive incentive contracts. |
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