An Empirical Study On The Effect Of The Allocation Of Control Rights On Corporate Performance Of The Listed Companies On GEM

The GEM market in China was formally established on October 30, 2009, as of December 31, 2016, a total of 573 companies listed on GEM. With the continuous development of the GEM, its existing problems are gradually surfaced, among which the struggle for control rights is the most obvious. How to regulate the allocation of control rights and how to improve the performance of the listed companies in the GEM is a hot issue both in the theoretical circle and in the practice of corporate governance. Because offamily characteristics, high growth and high-tech of the GEM, which is obviously different from the main board listed companies in the allocation of control rights on the issue,so it can not directly apply the existing strategy of the control right allocation of Listed company on the main board.Therefore, the research on the allocation of control rights of GEM listed companies has aroused the interest of scholars.At present, the research on the impact of the allocation of control rights on corporate performance is still in the initial stage. Based on the enterprise life cycle theory, this paper studies the impact of the allocation of control rights on the performance of Listed Companies in different stages, and it has practical guiding significance for the long-term development of the gem. First of all, this paper analyzes the influence mechanism of the enterprise life cycle on the relationship between the allocation of control and corporate performance on the basis of combing the relevant theories and literature. Secondly, the author uses cash flow characteristic combination method to divide the enterprise life cycle of the listed companies on the gem.Finally, we use multiple regression analysis to empirically test the impact of the allocation of control rights on corporate performance under different stages of growth.The results show that the influence of the allocation of control rights on the firm performance is dependent on the life cycle of the listed companies.During the growth period, the concentration of ownership,the chairman and the general manager of the two positions are positively correlated with firm performance, but the maturity of the equity concentration, the chairman and general manager of one of the two and corporate performance is negatively correlated. The degree of ownership balance, board size, the proportion of independent directors and corporate performance are negatively correlated during the growth period, while The degree of ownership balance, board size, the proportion of independent directors and corporate performance are positively correlated during the maturity period.This study focuses on the impact of the allocation of control rights on the performance of listed companies in different life cycle stages. It also aims to provide suggestions for the better development of the GEM while enriching the relationship between the two theories. This paper argues that the control of listed companies on the GEM should be dynamically configured according to the evolution of its life cycle, and maximize the positive effect of the control allocation on the performance of the enterprises.