Game Research About The Co-construction And Sharing Of Oil And Gas Pipeline

In order to analyze the influence of price reform and pipeline independence reform on the co-construction and sharing of oil and gas pipeline,this paper establishes game models which incorporate the core factors of the two reforms into corresponding models' analytical framework.The research results will be helpful for designing a proper scheme and obtaining a smooth implementation.First of all,from the perspective of corporate profit maximization,this paper establishes Spokes model composed of the existing pipeline asset and spillover effect to analyze the reasons for repeated construction of oil and gas pipeline.The research shows that pipeline has a strong natural monopoly,therefore,when the pipeline assets are asymmetric among oil and gas enterprises,the optimal strategy of the preponderant enterprise is to keep a low level of pipeline cooperation,which means the preponderant enterprise won't participate in any kind of pipeline cooperation,with the purpose of maximizing the monopolization force in the downstream market.For the inferior enterprises,there are two optimal strategies.On one hand,they can build more pipeline to bridge the gap with the preponderant enterprise.On the other hand,they quit the downstream market,and turn to the suppliers of the preponderant enterprise.However,if the pipeline assets are symmetric among oil and gas enterprises,the profits of all enterprises are free of the behavior of co-construction and sharing of oil and gas pipeline.The research results provide theoretic support for the independence reform of oil and gas pipeline.If the central government nationalizes the all the pipeline and set up specialized agency to manage all the pipeline,it will realize a balanced distribution of pipeline among oil and gas enterprises.Apparently,there won't exist repeated construction of oil and gas pipeline.With the help of previous analysis,this paper discusses the mechanism of action of the influence factors of pipeline cooperation with the assumption that the price reform of oil and gas has completed.This paper established a two-stage Stackelberg price competition model with duopoly enterprises.The result shows that if enterprises are able to set their product prices freely,the degree of pipeline cooperation is in inverse proportion to the market capacity,the coefficient of pipeline asset and market share and the pipeline advantage,and in proportion to the construction cost of pipeline and cooperative profit.In the end,this paper introduces the government,and analyzes the feasibility that the government enacts rules and regulations to guide the oil and gas enterprises to construct pipeline jointly or share their pipeline.Following the convention of economics,this paper treats the reward and the punishment derived from the macro-control methods of the government as a certain kind of income tax.And then this paper set up a two-stage dynamic game model with the government and the oil and gas enterprises.The results show that the macro-control methods of the government will guide the enterprises approach the co-construction and sharing level of pipeline favored by the government.However,the government should limit its tax objective and refer to the cost coefficients of pipeline cooperation of different enterprises.