Research On The The Impact Of Earnings Management On Investment Efficiency

Since the concept of earnings management has been put forward,the academic circles at home and abroad have never stopped the pace of earnings management.From the existing literature,the research on earnings management of previous literatures focus on the motives,means and methods.From the perspective of earnings management,to investigate the impact of investment efficiency,most scholars are based on the quality of financial information as an entry point to explore its impact on investment efficiency.As the academic circles have made a great breakthrough in the discussion of the consequences of earnings management,scholars have discussed the impact on the efficiency of investment.Under the influence of asymmetric information,the agency conflict is more serious,which has a great impact on the company's internal governance mechanism,and certainly affect the company's investment decisions.Besides,the “contract frictions” caused by information asymmetry and agency problems also promotes the earnings management behavior.Therefore,the investment behavior of enterprises will have correlation with earnings management.Based on this,this thesis in-depth analyzes the impact of earnings management on the investment efficiency and the influence of ownership structure on the relation between earnings management and investment efficiency from the angle of information asymmetry and agency problems.This thesis selects three hundreds and eighty companies listed on the Gem before the end of 2013,and selects the data of 2012-2015 as the sample.Through empirical study,results show that:The degree of earnings management is positively correlated with underinvestment and overinvestment,this shows that earnings management reduces the investment efficiency of GEM listed companies;The higher the degree of ownership concentration,the higher the degree of earnings management and investment efficiency,this shows that the GEM listed companies major shareholders' "tunneling effect" is more obvious,and the majority of shareholders control managers to conduct earnings management behavior to get more benefits.Thus,the agency problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders is increased,and the investment efficiency is reduced;The higher the degree of equity checks and balances(showing the check and balance function of the second largest shareholder of the GEM listed companies to the largest shareholder),the lower the degree of earnings management and the efficiency of investment,this shows that the higher the degree of ownership balance,the more effective the balance of the largest shareholder,and this canpromote the largest shareholder to supervise the behavior of managers to reduce the level of earnings management and improve investment efficiency;The higher the proportion of managerial ownership,the higher the degree of earnings management and investment efficiency,and the investment efficiency is reduced,this is contrary to the hypothesis of this thesis,and highlights the particularity of the ownership structure of GEM listed companies.