Research On The Relationship Between Executive Compensation And Non-efficiency Investment In Listed Companies

In today's economic situation,as small as a business development strategy,as large as a country's macroeconomic growth,investment has played a crucial role.As an important part of the national economic development strategy,investment for a country's macroeconomic,can play a significant role in promoting.However,inefficient investment phenomenon in C hina's state-owned listed companies is very common,a large number of waste of state capital.Inefficient investment is divided into two forms: overinvestment and underinvestment.Excessive investment performance for the executive to pursue excessive investment to bring their own economic benefits or enhance the value of as a professional manager,a project to blindly expand the amount of investment,more than its due amount;lack of investment performance for the executive satisfaction and In order to avoid the risks that may be faced or to distribute the remaining funds to please shareholders,we will choose a more conservative investment scheme,resulting in underinvestment in the face of good investment projects.Whether it is over-investment or lack of investment is a waste of corporate resources.The problem of agency is the source of inefficient investment.The separation of ownership and management leads to the disagreement between shareholders and managers.Only by unifying the interests of the two can we effectively avoid this problem.The most effective way to solve the problem is to pay the incentive,what kind of salary system is the most in line with the company's overall interests,and can effectively reduce the incidence of inefficient investment,is the main goal of this study.This paper attempts to discuss the correlation between executive compensation and overinvestment and underinvestment,so as to provide reasonable suggestions for the salary design of state-owned listed companies.