Research On Revenue-sharing Contract Of Two Echelon Supply Chain Dominated By Retailer

In recent years,as consumers increasingly rely on large retailers,the leadership of supply chain is gradually transferring from the supplier to the retailer.The retailer has dominant position and absolute power that can squeeze more profits of suppliers,and transfer risk to the supplier.In the long run,the suppliers will lose interest that is not conducive to the development of whole supply chain system.So we should take measures to coordinate the interests of both supplier and retailer so that supply chain members can optimize interests of the whole supply chain as well as meet their own interests.The revenue-sharing is an effective coordination mechanism,but research on revenue-sharing contract in retailer-dominated supply chain is still lacking.Moreover,in current research on revenue-sharing contract,most papers assume that the demand is a random variable or fixed.But in retailer-dominated supply chain,retailers have the right to determine price,and can influence demand.For suppliers,they need increase the relative level of product quality to increase customers' satisfaction,and then get more profits.Therefore,it is necessary to research revenue-sharing contract in retailer-dominated supply chain when demand depends on both price and the relative level of product quality.In addition,a lot of papers on revenue-sharing contract assume that members of supply chain are neutral to risk.With the development of behavioral economics,there is more and more research considering members' non rational factors.In retailer-dominated supply chain,different attitudes of suppliers towards risk have impact on members' decision-making and interests.Therefore,research on revenue-sharing contract when suppliers are risk sensitive has important theoretical and practical significance.Based on the summary of the existing research literature of revenue-sharing contract,retailer-dominated supply chain and risk preference,this article studies the application of revenue-sharing contract in a retailer-dominated supply chain consisted by a supplier and a retailer by using relevant theories of micro economics and behavioral economics and analyzing the decision-making behavior of member enterprises through the Stackelberg game theory.Firstly,this article studies the revenue-sharing contract in the retailer-dominated supply chain when the market scale is determined and the retailer has the wholesale pricing right.The market demand is affected by the retail price and the relative level of product quality.This research establishes the relevant model and analysis the sensitivity of relevant parameters.The results show that: supply chain coordination can be achieved in the specific parameters.The optimal retail price and the optimal relative level of product quality increase with the increase of the coefficient of the relative level of product quality and the coefficient of negotiation ability of suppliers on the wholesale price and decrease of retail price coefficient and the revenue-sharing ratio.Secondly,while other conditions do not change,this article studies the revenue-sharing contract in the retailer-dominated supply chain when the market scale is undetermined and the supplier is sensitive to risk.This research establishes the relevant model and analysis the sensitivity of relevant parameters.The results show that: supply chain coordination can be achieved in the specific parameters.The more risk aversion of suppliers,the greater loss to themselves and the supply chain system.