The Coordination Of Supply Chain With A Risk Aversion Supplier And A Risk Aversion Retailer Under Supply And Demand Uncertainties

With economic globalization,the supply chain decisions more and more challenges.At present,many scholars carried out extensive research on supply chain coordination problem in the case of demand uncertainty.However,in the decision-making of supply chain,there is other influencing factor beside the uncertainty of demand.First of all,the uncertainty of production,such as the yield of agricultural products which is affected by temperature,precipitation,etc..Secondly,the risk attitudes of the supply chain member also influences decisions-making.Therefore,in the case of uncertain production and demand,it is necessary to study the coordination of supply chain with the risk aversion members.The purpose of the thesis is to study the supply chain coordination problem where supply and demand are uncertain and suppliers and retailers are risk-averse.Firstly,a utility function is constructed to describe the risk aversion of supply chain members by applying the psychological account theory and penalty function.Then,using the new utility function,we analyze the influence of risk aversion on the decision of supply chain members and discuss the coordination of supply chain.The main contents include(1)The coordination of the supply chain under the buyback-cost loss sharing contract is studied.Firstly,by analyzing the risk and psychological account types of supply chain members,the utility function and decision model are constructed to analyze the impact of risk aversion on the optimal order quantity and optimal yield under the buyback-cost loss sharing contract.Then,the conditions coordinating the supply chain is discussed and the range of the contract parameters is analyzed.Finally,numerical examples is presented to verify the theory results and to analyze the influence of the contract parameters by the degree of risk aversion.The results show that under certain conditions,the buyback-cost loss sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain.(2)The coordination of the supply chain with revenue sharing-cost loss sharing contract is discussed.Firstly,the decentralized decision-making model was established,and the conditions for meeting the benefit-cost loss-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain were found.Secondly,the influence of contract parameters on the expected utility of supply chain members is analyzed.Finally,the results show that under certain conditions,the revenue sharing cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain,and the risk aversion coefficient can affect the range of contract parameters.(3)The coordination of the supply chain problem under cost sharing-residual compensation contract is explored.After discussing the decentralized decision model,the calculation finds the optimal decision of the supply chain for cost sharing-residual compensation contract.Finally,the theoretical results are verified by numerical experiments,and the influence of risk aversion on contract parameters is analyzed.The study show that cost sharing-residual compensation contract can coordinated the supply chain under certain conditions.