Study Of Coordination Mechanism For Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concerns

As people's consumption level improves,freshness of fresh agricultural products is getting more and more favor.Meanwhile,higher requirement on cold chain transport link has been proposed.However,in China,most fresh agricultural products are still transported at room temperature.Two reasons contribute to such situation as low integrated cold chain circulation rate and serious circulation loss.Firstly,cold chain logistics facilities and freshness-keeping technology of fresh agricultural products in China lag far behind.Secondly,some large fresh agricultural product suppliers are often in leading status in supply chain,which makes those vulnerable retailers feel unfair,so they just make the non-rational decision of reducing the freshness-keeping efforts or even just abandon such an idea.For that reason,this paper takes the supplier-dominated fresh agricultural supply chain as the object of the study to analyze operation bias on fresh agricultural supply chain caused by retailer's fairness concerns.After that,this paper will explore the coordination mechanism of fresh agricultural supply chain under the fairness concerns.The research in this paper will be conducted through such three aspects as retailer's not keeping freshness,retailer's keeping freshness independently and TPLSP's engaging in keeping freshness.Firstly,retailer's fairness concerns reference framework is built by using Nash bargaining game theory.Besides,concentrated and decentralized decision-making model of two-stage fresh agricultural supply chain(when retailer does not choose to keep freshness and keep freshness independently)as well as three-stage fresh agricultural supply chain(when TPLSP engages themselves in freshness-keeping)are established.What's more,this paper also explores the impacts on above-mentioned two-stage and threestage fresh agricultural supply chain exerted by fairness concerns.At last,this paper throws comparative analysis on the optimal decisions and profits between concentrated and decentralized decision-making and when retailer chooses to and not to keep freshness.Secondly,this paper takes concentrated decision-making as the benchmark.To deal with retailer's not keeping freshness case,this paper designs a revenue sharing contract as the coordination mechanism for the two-stage fresh agricultural supply chain.To deal with retailer's keeping freshness independently and TPLSP's engaging in keeping freshness case,this paper designs the "freshness-keeping cost sharing plus revenue sharing" contract as the coordination mechanism for the two-stage and three-stage fresh agricultural supply chain.Meanwhile,to overcome defects in traditional coordination contract,which lay too much on the spontaneous participation of the game participation party,this paper proposes the improved side-payment self-enforcing contract to coordinate the two-stage and three-stage fresh agricultural supply chain under the fairness concerns.Finally,this paper verifies the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms with numerical example.