Operational Mode And Coordination Mechanism Of Fresh Agri-products Supply Chain Under The Sight Of Game Theory

The thesis studies a fresh agri-products supply chain.Based on the assumption of certainty or randomness of market demand,game models are developed under different operational modes.Through discussing supply chain members’ decision-making behavior,reasonable contract mechanisms are designed to coordinate system and to achieve "win-win" situation.Firstly, according to supply chain members’ ability to strength,a supply chain consisted of a single supplier and a single retailer, can be divided into supplier-led and retailer-led.①The system operates under a mode in which a supplier acts as a Stackelberg leader while a retailer is responsible for logistics service.Considering the entity loss and the value loss of fresh agri-products,a Stackelberg game model is developed under the situation where logistics service level affects products’ supply rate and freshness. Research shows that a revenue and cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain.The contract is essential to allocate the system optimal profit between the supplier and the retailer.②The system operates under a mode in which a retailer acts as a Stackelberg leader while a supplier is responsible for the transportation.A Stackelberg game model is developed under the situation that the logistics service influences the market demand.Research shows that an option contract and an logistics service cost sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain system simultaneously.Secondly, unlike the above string supply chain, a divergent supply chain is studied with one supplier and two retailers to reduce the value loss of products in the market circulation.The supplier is a Stackelberg leader who is responsible for providing logistics service, while the retailers are followers with the horizontal competition, whose market demands are influenced by retail price and logistics service level. Considering Bertrand game and Stackelberg game between the retailers, SSB and SSS game models are established respectively. Research shows that: the supplier tends to provide homogeneous logistics service in the SSB model, and the supplier tends to provide heterogeneous logistics service in the SSS model.Finally, combined with strong retailer and weak supplier realistic background of our agricultural industry, supply chain coordination is studied with vendor managed consignment inventory mode. Assuming that the sale price and freshness influence the market demand, the supplier is responsible for transporting products and disposing of residual products in the string supply chain.A Stackelberg game model is established under VMCI environments when the manufacturer manages the retailer’s inventory and meanwhile the retailer makes the payment according to the actual amount sold. Research shows that the contract combination, consisted of a revenue sharing contract, a logistics service cost sharing contract and a residual products cost sharing contract, can coordinate the supply chain system efficiently.Numerical examples are given to verify conclusions of above game models and the feasibility of contract combinations.