Study On Credit-guarantee Contracts Of The Core Enterprise In A Capital-constraint Supply Chain

The financing issues of parties in supply chain not only reduce their own performance but also the efficiency of supply chain,which becomes one of main obstacles to the development of supply chain.How to solve financing issues in supply chain have received unprecedented attention from all walks of life.Currently,the credit-guarantee contract is confirmed to be one of effective methods to solve financing issue and improve supply chain efficiency.And a supply chain may operate under either preorder mode or consignment mode,therefore,the different credit-guarantee contracts are designed respectively to solve the financing issues according to the characteristics of supply chain,which has important significance in theory and practice.Firstly,we consider financing issue of a capital-constrained retailer in the supply chain,which operates under preorder mode,when bankruptcy costs exists in this paper.In order to solve retailer's financing issue,two different credit-guarantee contracts are designed on the basis of supplier's guarantee responsibilities.Based on these two contracts,we establish two Stackelberg games which lead to equilibrium solutions in order quantity and wholesale price.Furthermore,we analyze the impacts of bankruptcy costs on optimal decisions and perform a comparative analysis of two contracts in order to identify the application scope of them.Our results show that the remaining loan guarantee contract is always beneficial to the supplier,however,supply chain has higher profits under the loan interest guarantee contract than that achieved under remaining loan guarantee contract.Therefore,without revenue sharing mechanism,the remaining loan guarantee contract is always adopted by the supplier.If some appropriate revenue sharing mechanisms can be established by negotiations,the supplier can be motivated to choose the loan interest guarantee contract to achieve a win-win situation between the retailer and supplier.Then,we consider a two-echelon consignment supply chain with a capital-constrained supplier and a creditworthy retailer.And the retailer's credit guarantee is used to help a supplier borrow money from a bank to solve this retailer's financing issue.Moreover,we analyze the coordination of capital-constrained consignment supply chain under the credit-guarantee contract.We develop a mathematical model to lead to optimal production quantity and optimal credit-guarantee amount.When the commission rates of retailer are small,the optimal production quantity of supply chain is controlled by the retailer's optimal credit-guarantee amount.When the commission rates of retailer are large,the optimal production quantity of supply chain is controlled by the supplier's optimal production quantity.Therefore,the allocation proportion of sales revenue is a key factor to coordinate a capital-constrained consignment supply chain.We conclude that there exists some appropriate commission rates and retailer's guarantee coefficients to reallocate profits and risks of supply chain and make the optimal decisions coordinate consignment supply chain under the credit-guarantee contract.Finally,we study impacts of retailer's attitudes toward risks on optimal decisions in a consignment supply chain.As a result,the optimal credit-guarantee amount and optimal production quantity for a loss averse retailer are smaller than that achieved for a risk neutral retailer in a consignment supply chain.In summary,the credit-guarantee contracts designed in this paper not only solve the financing issue of capital-constrained supply chain,but also improve the efficiency of capital-constrained supply chain.Thus,the conclusions achieved in this paper provide a reference for supply chain to solve financing issues and improve the profits.