Research On Supply Chain Contracts With Cash Flow Constrains

This paper tries to coordinate a capital-constrained supply chain whichconsists of a supplier and a news-vender retailer by using supply chaincontracts. The retailer has only a chance to order products from only onesupplier. The supplier is capital-constrained when she doesn’t have enoughmoney to produce what the retailer needs. If the retailer can’t pay for the order,then he is capital-constrained.There is only one selling season with stochastic demand. Normalize tozero the salvage value of left over inventory and any indirect costs due to lostsales. When the supplier is capital-constrained, buyback contract, revenuesharing contract and two-part tariff contract have been used to coordinate thesupply chain. However, the optimal performance of the supply chain is not aswell as the one without capital-constrained. When the retailer iscapital-constrained, if the retailer gets financial service from the financialmarket, buyback contract still coordinates the supply chain in this setting.Given that the supply chain performance is damaged, we then study anothermechanism between the supplier and the retailer. It can be considered as theretailer gets financial service from the supplier. In such a setting, the supplychain performance is the same as the one without capital-constrained.Whereas the supplier will share more risk.Then this paper extends the newsvendor model by the retailer to choosehis retail price in addition to his stocking quantity. In this setting, the demanddepends on the retail price. The salvage value is positive. Normalize to zeroany indirect costs due to lost sales. The retailer is capital-constrained and getsfinancial service from financial market. Coordination is achieved by usingrevenue sharing contract. The cost of financial service becomes higher whenthe price and the salvage value get lower. At last, we find the way to solve themodel and get the optimal decision of the supply chain.