The Relationship Between Equity Incentive And Performance Of State-owned Listed Companies Research

In the joint-stock company,the principal-agent problem is an important factor restricting the development of the company.How to solve the principal-agent problem has always been the focus of domestic and foreign scholars.As an effective means of long-term incentive,equity incentive is considered to be one of the effective ways to solve the principal-agent problem.Compared with the western developed countries,equity incentive in China’s development started late,the relevant legal system,economic base and corporate governance level and other supporting mechanism is not perfect.At the same time,the research on the relationship between equity incentive and operating performance of listed companies in our country is not yet mature.The research on the relationship between equity incentive and operating performance of state-owned listed companies is more and less.State-owned listed companies play an important role in the key areas of China’s national economy and play a major role in the sustained,rapid and healthy development of the national economy.In recent years,the number of state-controlled listed companies withholding incentive has been increasing,but whether there is some controversy in whether the equity incentive can effectively improve the management enthusiasm and improve the business performance.Therefore,in order to promote the continuous development of state-controlled listed companies in China,we need to study the relationship between equity incentive and performance of state-controlled listed companies.This paper chooses the financial data of the state-controlled listed companies from2012 to 2015,through the establishment of the performance evaluation model,the linear and non-linear fitting equations that affect other factors,the linear regression model and the nonlinear regression model An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Equity Incentive and Performance of State-owned Listed Companies.At the same time,the use of independent sample T test and other methods to examine the implementation and implementation of the equity incentive of state-controlled listed companies operating performance there is a significant difference.The empirical research has obtained the following conclusions: First,there is no significant correlation between the equity incentive and the performance of the state-owned listed companies,regardless ofwhether or not other factors are taken into consideration.Secondly,under the existing equity incentive level,There is no significant difference in the performance of the state-controlled listed companies.Thirdly,there is no significant difference in the performance of the state-controlled listed companies that have not implemented the equity incentive.According to the existing problems and the empirical research conclusion of the equity incentive of the state-controlled listed companies,this paper puts forward the suggestions to improve the equity incentive effect of the state-controlled listed companies from the internal and external aspects of the company.Internal level of recommendations:(1)design a reasonable exercise program;(2)develop a reasonable performance appraisal indicators;(3)establish a sound mechanism to monitor the equity incentive.External level of recommendations:(1)improve the professional managers market;(2)establish a sound capital market.