Research On The Effect Of Managerial Ownership On Mergers And Acquisitions Performance In State-owned Listed Companies

China is now in a period of profound economic reform,the market economy mechanism is constantly improved,and the enterprises are increasingly influenced by the capital market.In order to achieve rapid expansion of scale and increase market share,many enterprises will realize long-term strategic planning through merger and acquisition.In recent years,the global wave of mergers and acquisitions has surged,all kinds of mergers and acquisitions are emerging,the quantity and amount of mergers and acquisitions are increasing.Merger and acquisition(M & A)is a major investment decision that can reflect the long-term development goals of the enterprise,and it will have a significant impact on the shareholder value.M & A can enable managers to make investment decisions based on maximizing shareholder value,and may also encourage managers to use their own power to manage and defend,thereby exacerbating agency conflicts.Therefore,M & A is an ideal platform for testing managers to motivate their effectiveness.State owned enterprises are the foundation of China's national economic development.They are of great significance to make up for the shortcomings of the market mechanism,maintain the normal operation of social economy and promote the balanced development of regional economy.With the non tradable share reform in 2008 and 2015 the implementation of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises to introduce guidance system,occupation managers within the state-owned enterprises gradually establish and perfect,the degree of separation of the two rights is more and more high,the principal-agent problem existing in enterprises is becoming more and more serious.This paper mainly studies state owned enterprises in state-owned enterprises.Because the information asymmetry exists in the state holding enterprises,management is prone to adverse selection and moral hazard in the process of investment decision making,resulting in managerial shortsighted behavior and rent-seeking behavior.Effective corporate governance mechanism can motivate managers to conduct good behavior management.Managerial ownership is one of the most common corporate governance mechanisms to solve agency problems.Managerial ownership is one of the main modes of management incentives,allowing managers to participate in the company'sresidual dividends,effectively promoting the consistency of management interests and company interests,so that managers can make investment decisions according to the maximization of shareholder value.For state-owned holding enterprises,whether mergers and acquisitions decisions affect the performance of enterprises is an important criterion to test the consistency between management and government shareholders.Does the managerial ownership effectively solve the principal-agent problem of the state-owned holding enterprises? How does it affect the incentives and constraints of management? What are the effects of M & a decision making and the selection of M & a program? In this paper,state-owned enterprise reform mixed vigorously promote the shareholding of management under the background of selected Nari for case analysis,we find that the management ownership effect and existing problems in this system and constantly improve the management ownership of reference.This article is divided into four parts to discuss,the main contents are as follows: the first part introduces the research background,purpose and significance of the article.Then,on the basis of literature review at home and abroad,the research content of the paper is expounded.The second part first defines the basic concepts of M & A and managerial shareholding.Secondly,based on the theory of managerial ownership,it analyzes the impact mechanism of managerial ownership on the consequences of M & A.The third part begins with the merger and acquisition of the state-owned holding listed companies with managerial ownershipFinancial indicators of the overall analysis,the equivalent of Nari asset size of the state-owned holding enterprises financial status,and analysis of Nari at the level of performance in the whole sample.Secondly,the comparative analysis of the state power Nari management ownership before and after the implementation of M & a performance consequence,determine the performance effect of state power Nari implementation of management shareholding system.The fourth part is the conclusions and recommendations of this paper.It mainly discusses the third part of the research conclusions,and puts forward specific recommendations,and on this basis,puts forward the limitations and future prospects of this research.