Ownership Concentration,Internal Control And Corporate Executives' Corruption Governance

The development process of modern enterprise is not only a microcosm of the progress of social civilization,but also a long history of anti-corruption struggle.Corruption of corporate executives may hinder the normal development of enterprises and may even undermine the order of social stability.Therefore,corporate executives' corruption governance,whether it is for the enterprise or the country is of great significance.The study of corporate executives 'corruption from the beginning of the last century has never been interrupted.Most scholars have focused on the relevance of internal control and corporate executives' corruptions,most of whom have affirmed the suppression of executives' corruptions by internal control.In most enterprises,the ownership structure of enterprises determines the effectiveness of corporate governance.In particular,the level of ownership concentration is significantly related to the severity of agency problems,but the direct study of equity concentration and corporate executives' corruption has been very rare.In addition,because the focus of anti-corruption investigation launched against government agencies and state-owned enterprises in recent years,most of the academic literature was only investigated corruption in governance of state-owned enterprises,making non-state-owned enterprises corruption governance research has not been fully paid attention.There are even some scholars believe that "corruption refers only to corruption of government and state-owned enterprises".These are the problems of the urgent need to be solved and perfected in the study of corporate corruption.On the basis of information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,masters theory,property right theory and incomplete contract theory,we analyze the influence of internal control and ownership concentration on corporate executives' corruptions in combination with the previous scholars' research results,according to which three basic assumptions are proposed.Then based on 2011-2015 data sample A-share listed companies in China,the use of empirical research methods to executives' corruption as the dependent variable,with ownership concentration as explanatory variables,internal controls as mediator,we examine the effect of equity concentration on corporate executives' corruption and validates how the impact is generated through internal control.On the basis of the above empirical research,we also use the method of groupinspection to compare the effect of ownership concentration in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises on corporate executives' corruption.Results show that improving the quality of internal control can significantly inhibit corporate executives' corruption.We also find that with other factors under the control of the premise,the more concentrated corporate ownership concentration,the lower the level of corruption executives.Results also showed that compared with state-owned enterprises,the concentration of equity in non-state-owned enterprises is more obvious to the governance of corporate executives' corruption.Finally,the intermediary effect test proves that the partial mediating effect of internal control is established,which means the effect of ownership concentration on the corruption of enterprise executives has both direct effect and indirect effect through internal control,which shows that the increase of ownership concentration can curb the corruption of corporate executives through the improvement of the quality of internal control.The research results of this paper have certain reference value for the actual corruption prevention work.From the work of thinking,enterprises can focus on optimizing the ownership structure,such as improving the concentration of ownership to enhance the influence of the internal governance.On this basis,strengthen the construction of internal control can improve the mode of action of governance,and the rational design and implementation of internal controls may ensure that the effect of governance of the upper level can be maximized.In addition,the comparison between state-owned enterprises and non-state enterprises further shows that separation of government and enterprises is an important prerequisite for state-owned enterprises to fight corruption,while the concentration of equity is more effective for the corruption of nonstate enterprises.