The Study On The Relationship Between China's Listed Companies' Equity Concentration And The Executive Pay GAP

With the continuous development of market economy in our country,the market position of listed companies has become increasingly important in our country.The separation of operation right and ownership leads to the existence of principal-agent problems,further aggravating the shareholders of a company supervision and management of the difficulty of the operator.In order to better motivate executives,formulate appropriate compensation management system is particularly important.Executive compensation incentive system can make up the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers,promote the development of company more steadily.Now existing related research prove that the company there is close relationship between ownership concentration and executive pay gap,it is necessary to carry out further research.Based on the principal-agent theory,the tournament theory,behavior theory and the theory of corporate governance,combined with the ownership concentration,by using 2010-2017 panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen a-share listed companies in our country,trying to find out the relationship between equity concentration and executive internal and external pay gap;State-owned enterprises properties differences on the relationship between ownership concentration and internal and external executive pay gap;industry competition degree on the relationship between ownership concentration and the the executive internal and external pay gap.The empirical results show that: first,the higher the ownership concentration,internal executive pay gap is smaller;The higher the ownership concentration,executives outside wage gap is smaller.Second,the higher the proportion of state-owned equity concentration,the greater the negative correlation between equity concentration and the executive internal pay gap;the higher the proportion of state-owned equity concentration,the greater the negative correlation between equity concentration and the executive external pay gap.Third,compared with the lower level of competition of industry,the higher the degree of competition in the industry,equity concentration is not obvious negative correlation on the executive internal pay gap;Compared with low levels of competitive industries,the higher the degree of competition in the industry,equity concentration is negative correlation the smaller on executive external pay gap.In this paper,the results confirmed that the listed company may adjust the equityconcentration,to influence the company internal and external executive pay gap,and then solve the problem of entrust-agent,and thus achieve executive compensation incentive;At the same time,it is worth noting that the different nature of property rights of listed companies and the different proportion of state-owned shares of listed companies,in a different industry competition degree of the differences between the boss company.This paper also by replacing the ownership concentration the proxy variable of test model results,the robustness test and the main test results are consistent,support the conclusion of this article research.