Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Anti Takeover Of Listed Companies

Along with the development of Chinese economy and the more perfect capital markets,corporate mergers and acquisitions showed a trend of growth.If the target company wants to effectively implement the anti-takeover measures,it is necessary to draw lessons from the successful experience of western countries.Based on the successful experience of anti-takeover measures from western countries,and combining with our country socialist economic system,our research aim at our country's listed companies of anti-takeover measures.Firstly,the research of M&A cases is to reasonable for establishing and perfecting the system of anti-takeover measures and maintaining the price stability of target company.Secondly it can help build a benignly diversified structure of the target company equity.Such dispersed shareholders holding can significantly reduce the risk of shareholders.At the same time,companies can also markedly reduced the cost of financing,and the stock market slowly return to its true value.It also reduced the risk of the financial market.This paper analyses the spat between China's largest property developer Vanke and Baoneng Group,described the participants and strategy of M&A event.Then we use the evolutionary game theory to investigate whether the white knight strategy for Vanke is useful,and whether the poison pill strategy is better.We first introduced the related literature review of mergers and acquisitions,and the related theory of M&A financing mode and the anti-takeover strategy.Second we described the evolutionary game theory in this paper,and take the example of Vanke and Baoneng Group M&A event.Finally we come to a conclusion and puts forward some relevant policy Suggestions.Through the evolutionary game theory,we show that in mergers and acquisitions which uses external financing,the white knight and share buyback plan often have little effect.The effect of the poison pill,lawsuits and other strategies,are much more better.