Study On The Correlation Between Executive Compensation And Accounting Information Disclosure Quality Based On Corporate Governance

After decades of development,China's stock market is moving towards a standardized track,but the financial frauds among listed companies still occur during this process,and many problems are still exist in accounting information disclosure especially.Finding out the way to improve the quality is of utmost urgency nowadays.There are many reasons leading to the distortion phenomenon of accounting information disclosure.One of the important factors which impacts the quality of accounting information disclosure is the company's internal governance structure.As the core of the corporate governance structure,the defects in executive incentives have an inescapable responsibility for the distortion of accounting information.Based on the existing research,this paper analyzes the correlation between executive compensation and the quality of accounting information by using principle-agent theory,incentive theory and information asymmetry theory.And further discusses the corporate governance factors that affect the relationship from three angles:the property rights,the board characteristics and the degree of ownership concentration.Through the selection of the panel data of listed companies from 2010 to 2015,this paper gets the following conclusions:firstly,the quality of accounting information disclosure and executive compensation is related;secondly,there is higher correlation between the executive compensation and disclosure quality in state-owned enterprise;thirdly,the effect of the size of the board and the number of board meeting is inconspicuous to the correlation,while the proportion of independent directors,CEO Duality and ownership concentration have significant impact on the correlation.To some extent,this paper enriches the existing research on the relationship between executive compensation and the quality of accounting information disclosure.