Does The Board Secretary Holding A Concurrent Post Affect The Quality Of Information Disclosure

The board secretarial system is a key effective part of the corporate governance structure of the listed company,but it is still in the period of adjustment and perfecting in our country.Board secretary is a spokesman for the listed companies,being responsible for the company's information disclosure and investor relations management,preparations for the general meeting of shareholders and the board,file storage,etc.He or she is also the contact person of listed company and regulatory department.From the ordinary secretary work to the senior management personnel established until now,the important role of the board secretary is gradually drawing more attention from people.Especially since the new company's law established the executive position of the board secretary legally for the first time,the special role has always been a hot topic.Board secretary's most important duty is in charge of information disclosure.As the publisher of information,the board secretary has become the first person responsible of a listed company conveying company information to the owners,regulators and the public.Therefore,how to design and perfect the system of board secretary is an important way to improve the quality of corporate disclosure.It is necessary to excavate the potential of improving the quality of information disclosure from the point of the board secretary.From the statistic data,the "part-time board secretary" proportion is gradually rising.More and more board secretaries hold a concurrent post as a director or a manager,or other senior management personnel because of the lack of related information rights and participation rights as the "full-time board secretary".As an information publisher,a board secretary needs to acquire comprehensive information to release more accurate information.But as a result of each layer of the principal-agent relationship,the general shareholders,board of directors and managers have different interests,and a board secretary will inevitably be restricted in the process of coordination,even "pressed".Information transferring is not always very smoothly.Just as the board secretary himself or herself,he or she neither has the responsibilities for participating in the company's daily management like the managers,nor has enough rights to supervise managers as the directors,without a platform for obtaining information.Therefore,it is always the reason for the information disadvantage of the "professional board secretary" that the rights and responsibilities are not equal and the information asymmetry.Also different identities have the different ways to impact on the quality of information disclosure.Therefore,in this paper,I set he board secretary identity as the breakthrough point,and from the perspective of the literature and the policy development,according to the theory of information economics,principal-agent theory,and the modern housekeeper theory as the foundation,using the Shenzhen stock exchange all A-share listed companies in 2011-2015 panel data to research whether a board secretary concurrently holding other executive positions can promote the quality of information disclosure.The main body of this article is divided into three levels.The first is to explore whether "the part-time board secretary" has more information superiority than "the full-time board secretary",and whether it can improve the quality of the information disclosure.Second,according to the two paths of holding a concurrent post as a manager or a director,"the part-time board secretary" has been divided into three kinds of identities for further inquiry,namely only hold concurrent post as a manager,only hold concurrent post as a director,and as internal directors,and we also discuss which kind of executive identity can improve the quality of information disclosure more efficiently.The third is that,given the overlap of the close relationship and responsibilities between a board secretary and a CFO,we will conduct the independent research on whether a board secretary who holds a concurrent post as a CFO will help improve the quality of the disclosure.In addition,this paper further studies on the dynamic variation of whether holding a concurrent position and asymmetrical degree of information asymmetry in the test of robustness.The study finds that "the part-time board secretary" does better than "the full-time board secretary".Second,whether a board secretary holds a concurrent as a manager,a director or a internal director,it is able to improve the quality of the information disclosure,but it failed to ensure which identity can make more efficiently.Finally,a board secretary who holds a concurrent post as a CFO can give full play to information superiority and disclose information efficiently.In addition,from a dynamic perspective,the board secretary is able to improve the quality of the information disclosure if his or her position is from "full-time" to "part-time",and reduce the quality of the information disclosure if he or her position is from"part-time" to "full-time".According to different degree of agency conflict,the sample is divided two groups on the basis of overhead expenses rate,and finds that the effect of the "part-time board secretary" is more significant in high agency cost group,which further confirms the principal-agent system theory basis of information asymmetry.This paper enriches the board secretary policy and the related research in the field of corporate governance;aiming at the general phenomenon of a board secretary holding a concurrent position,we provide a new empirical evidence for the root and motivation.And we also provide a new train of thought to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.