The Study On The Influence Of Board Secretary's Incentives On The Information Disclosure Quality

The problem of information disclosure has always been the focus in the practical and theoretical circles,information disclosure can alleviate principal-agent and reduce information asymmetry.However,in China,the incidents of information disclosure violations in listed companies continue to ferment in recent years,the problem of information disclosure is not optimistic.As an important institutional arrangement of corporate governance,board secretary is responsible for the listed company's information disclosure,if board secretary could be fully utilized,the company's information disclosure quality would be improved.Some scholars have discussed the impact of the board secretary's personal characteristics on the company's information disclosure quality,while ignore the role of incentive mechanism.As a rational economic person,the board secretary also needs incentives to motivate his or her work motivation,and the effective incentive mechanism would promote the board secretary word hard,thus improving the company's information disclosure quality.This paper takes 1197 listed companies in Shenzhen A shares for the period 2011-2018 as the research object.Based on the perspective of the board secretary's incentives,this paper explores the impact of board secretary's monetary compensation incentives,equity incentive and reputation incentives on the company's information disclosure quality.At the same time,this paper further examines the role of the board secretary's human capital and multiple identities in it.In addition,this paper further studies the differences in the impact mechanism of the board secretary on the information disclosure quality in different corporate governance environments.The results show that: Firstly,board secretary's monetary compensation incentives and reputation incentives have a significant positive impact on the listed company's information disclosure quality,and there is an inverted U-type relationship between board secretary's equity incentives information disclosure quality.Secondly,the board secretary's human capital can effectively promote the positive effect of board secretary's monetary compensation incentives and reputation incentives on company's information disclosure quality,and the strengthening effect of board secretary's human capital on the inverted U-shaped relationship between equity incentives and information disclosure quality is not significant.Thirdly,the board secretary's multiple identities have a positive adjustment effect on the relationship between board secretary's monetary compensation incentives and information disclosure quality,and can strengthen the inverted U-type relationship between board secretary's equity incentives and information disclosure quality,but the positive adjustment effect on the relationship between board secretary's reputation incentives and information disclosure quality is not significant.Fourthly,the role of the board secretary's multiple identities and human capital in regulating the relationship between the board secretary's incentives and the information disclosure quality is only in the listed companies with poor internal corporate governance.The main innovation of this paper is that this paper explores the influence mechanism about board secretary to of information disclosure quality from incentive perspective for the first time,and considers the role of board secretary's multiple identities and human capital in it.The conclusions of this paper can provide a reference for further perfecting the system of the board secretary and improving the listed companies' information disclosure quality.