Whether The Inquiry Letter Of The Annual Report Of The Shanghai Stock Exchange Can Improve The Quality Of Information Disclosure

China's securities legal system is based on the protection of investors' legitimate rights and interests as the core task.Investors' investment and other activities mainly rely on the analysis of information publicly disclosed by the company.Therefore,the provisions of information disclosure of listed companies is the core securities law system in China.The protection of investors' rights and interests depends to some extent on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.Therefore,it is of great importance to effectively supervise the disclosure of information of listed companies in China.The supervisory authority has always paid close attention to the effective supervision of the information disclosure of capital market in China.In recent years,China has continued to promote the transition of securities market supervision to information disclosure.As a result,the main force for the supervision of listed companies has gradually shifted to stock exchanges.They are at the forefront of capital market supervision,and they have taken the brunt of their supervisory duties,responding in a timely and flexible manner.The changes in the market are mainly based on the supervision of voluntary information disclosure,and are mainly responsible for the supervision and investigation of information disclosure violations,and strive to meet the CSRC's goal of maximizing investor protection.However,self-regulation of information disclosure of China's stock exchanges of whether the actual results have not yet been determined conclusion.Recently,the stock exchange has established a multiple-message supervision mechanism including inquiry letters,regulatory letters,and attention letters.In response to information publicly released by listed companies regarding investor decision-making,and sending letters of inquiry to listed companies,etc.,listed companies are required to explain the problems and mistakes listed in the correspondence or correct errors in the disclosed information.The company that receives the correspondence needs to respond to the contents of the inquiry letter and publish it in the form of a reply letter.This is both an opportunity to supplement disclosure and a norm for information disclosure for companies.Some scholars have confirmed through research that,on the one hand,information disclosure of negative events can bring negative spillover effects to the industry due to the transmission effect.On the other hand,after the disclosure of negative events,companies in the same industry with better corporate governance mechanisms will have a positive spillover effect due to competition effects.Based on the above background,this paper takes the evidence of the annual report inquiry letter in the periodic report inquiries in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the research object,and analyzes whether the mechanism of the annual report inquiry letter in China's stock exchange has actual results.This paper selects the annual report inquiry letter issued by the stock exchange from 2015 to 2017 as a research sample,and empirically examines whether the annual report inquiry letter mechanism can cause a significant market reaction,whether there is an industry spillover effect,and whether it can improve the disclosure quality of listed companies..The empirical results show that the closer the letter of inquiry of the annual report of the exchange is to the disclosure time of the annual report,the more timely the annual report inquiry letter,and the higher the information content of the annual report inquiry letter,the more it can cause a significant market reaction.The annual report enquiry letter includes the information that requires the enterprise to correct the wrong information.Compared with not requiring the correction of the wrong information,the higher the information content of the annual report inquiry letrter,the more it can cause a significant market reaction.The annual report inquiring letter is for the company to send a letter again,the more it can cause a significant market reaction.The inquiries from the listed companies to receive the annual report of the exchange have spillover effects on the industry in which they are located,which has led to a significant market reaction for companies in the same industry.At the same time,the annual report inquiries can,on the one hand,point out that the information disclosure problem of the company's annual report has information content.On the other hand,it gives the company an opportunity to explain again,and it can improve the quality of information disclosure.The final conclusion is that the annual report inquiry letter mechanism is effective.This article expands the existing research on the effectiveness of domestic listed companies listed on the information disclosure,and makes up for the lack of research on the regulatory mechanism of existing research in the stock exchange for self-disciplined information disclosure.In addition,the effective conclusions of the stock exchange inquiry letter mechanism obtained by this paper can provide necessary reference for supervision of the capital market,and at the same time,it supplements the new empirical evidence for the regulatory effectiveness of the exchange's self-disciplined information disclosure.At the same time,the empirical test results of this paper can help the practice community and academia to understand the institutional characteristics of the system of the annual inquiry letter of the exchange to some extent.