Annual Report Inquiry,Nature Of Property Rights And Earnings Management

In order to regulate the information disclosure behavior of listed companies,strengthen the responsibility of information disclosure,improve the quality of information,and protect investors' legal interests,China established the information disclosure through train system in 2012,so that the information disclosure behavior of listed companies is changed from the pre-examination of the stock exchange.Be supervised afterwards.Under the information disclosure through train system,issuing a letter of inquiry to a listed company is the main form of supervision adopted by the stock exchange.In 2014,the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange began to issue inquiries on the fixed columns of their official websites in 2017 and requested the corresponding companies to issue timely reply letters and publicly issue inquiries.This provides an opportunity for the regulatory effect of the research inquiry system.At present,the research on the inquiry letter of the academic circles has just begun,and basically the efficiency of the inquiry letter is verified from the perspectives of market reaction,audit quality and audit cost.This paper draws on the research methods and established conclusions of scholars at home and abroad.From the perspective of earnings management,verify the implementation effect of the exchange inquiry letter.This paper selected companies which are listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the research sample,research period is from 2014 to 2018,and it manually collects the annual report inquiries.Based on the above sample data,(1)descriptive statistics,univariate test and full sample test on the basic characteristics of the listed company that received the annual report inquiry letter from China and the listed company that did not receive the annual report inquiry letter,indicating that the annual report was received.The enterprise's accrued earnings management level of the inquiry letter is lower than that of the enterprise that did not receive the annual report inquiry letter,and the real earnings management level is higher than that of the enterprise that did not receive the annual report inquiry letter,and there is no significant difference in the total earnings management level;(2)Facing with the exact fact that China owns its' special institutional background and the different property rights from other countries,the non-state-owned enterprise annual inquiry letter has a more significant impact on earnings management behavior compared with state-owned enterprises;(3)in order to solve endogenousproblems and ensure results Robustness,this paper uses the propensity value matching method(PSM)to verify,the results show that the above conclusions are still valid;(4)By summarizing the results of empirical analysis,the limitations of the regulatory effect of the inquiry letter system are proposed from the perspectives of internal and internal internal governance,government supervision,and CPA supervision,and the limitations of this paper are elaborated.The main contributions of this paper are verifying the implementation effect of the inquiry letter system from the perspective of earnings management,and providing certain empirical data for the development of the relevant regulatory policies of the CSRC or the stock exchange,and the implementation of the supervision methods to promote China's capital market.Continuous development to improve the efficiency of resource allocation;helping investors,creditors or government regulators to better understand the value of company behavior and related information and improve information users by revealing changes in earnings management behavior after receiving the letter of inquiry from the stock exchange annual report.The correctness of the decision;consider the impact of non-punitive supervision on corporate earnings management behavior and refine the study of earnings management.