Study On The Influence Of The Comparability Of Accounting Information On Corporate Investment Efficiency

The "Thirteenth Five-year Plan for National Economic and Social Development"clearly puts a prominent position on improving the investment efficiency of the entire capital market.Studying the influence of the comparability of accounting information on the efficiency of corporate investment,the analysis of the mechanism between the two can not be ignored.Therefore,this paper starts with the main reasons for inefficient investment-information asymmetry and principal-agent issues.The analysis of higher comparability of accounting information is beneficial to the interaction between corporate shareholders and managers and external information users(outside investment And the improvement of the information environment between managers and managers,which in turn affects the economic behavior of managers,and reduces the excessive investment caused by the construction of "corporate buildings" and"consumer spending," and the reduction of external investors and creditors.External information users seek under higher risk premiums for underinvestment of their companies because they cannot obtain internal information of the target company.After the theoretical analysis of the comparability of accounting information on the mechanism of corporate investment efficiency is completed,this paper takes the sample of all A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen cities from 2007 to 2016 as a research sample and analyzes them through empirical methods.The empirical part of the research approach is:First,to study the impact of comparability of accounting information on corporate investment over-investment and corporate underinvestment behavior,and further,to study the nature of different property rights,the degree of investor protection on the comparability of accounting information and corporate overinvestment.,the impact of the relationship between the lack of corporate investment.The empirical research results of this paper show that:(1)The comparability of accounting information and the over-investment behavior and under-investment behavior of enterprises show a significant negative correlation,that is,higher comparability of accounting information can reduce non-relation to a certain extent.(2)In order to further explore the influence of the nature of property rights on the comparability of accounting information with the over-investment of companies and the under-investment of enterprises,the sample will be based on the actual controller's The nature is grouped and returned separately.It is found that compared to the listed company with the actual controller as the state-owned company,the negative correlation between the comparability of the accounting information of the non-state-owned listed company and the over-investment behavior of the company is not obvious,and the comparability of accounting information is not significant.The impact on the underinvestment of enterprises is even more pronounced in listed companies with non-state-owned controllers.(3)Under the environment of high level of investor protection,the negative correlation between the comparability of accounting information and overinvestment of enterprises is not obvious,and the negative correlation between comparability of accounting information and underinvestment of enterprises.The relationship weakens.Then,the author further examined the robustness of the model through multiple analyses of the research results and found no significant changes in the research conclusions.Finally,the author put forward relevant suggestions based on the empirical research results.