Accounting Investor Protection And Corporate Investment Efficiency

Financing,investment,and distribution are the three important decisions of corporate financial management.Financing is the premise of investment.Investment is an important source of corporate value creation.It is the basis for enterprises to grow bigger and stronger.They obtain income through investment and then allocate it to investors,allocating the value and free cash flow created by investment activities.Therefore,investment is not an independent financial activity.Investment efficiency is directly related to the recovery of corporate costs and the creation of benefits,which in turn affects the distribution of corporate profits and the realization of investor returns.However,in practice,inefficient investment behaviors such as insufficient investment and excessive investment caused by agency problems and information asymmetry are widespread,affecting the efficiency of capital allocation,damaging corporate value and investor interests,and reducing investor enthusiasm.Therefore,only when the interests of investors are effectively protected,can the relationship between investment and other financial activities be cleared,investment efficiency can be improved,and corporate value can be maximized.In the current research,investor protection at the legal or social norm level is external,ex post facto,and passive.It addresses the symptoms but not the root causes.This article is based on multiple theoretical perspectives.Run the five elements of accounting investor protection,study its impact mechanism to curb inefficient investment and improve investment efficiency,and further test the intermediary mechanism of capital investment.This article first analyzes the internal mechanism of the relationship between accounting investor protection and corporate investment efficiency based on a multi-theoretical perspective.It selects 2013-2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed company sample data for regression,and empirically tests relationship between accounting investor protection and companies inefficient investments,while examining the regulatory role of the ultimate controller.It then further examines the role of accounting investor protection in influencing the intermediary path of inefficient investment by influencing the capital investment of the enterprise,distinguishes between different types of inefficient investment and the different nature of the ultimate controller,and explores the relationship between the three in detail.Finally,Logit regression and Bootstrap analysis were used to verify the main effect and the intermediary effect,respectively,to ensure the robustness of the empirical results.Empirical research finds that accounting investor protection can improve the inefficient investment of enterprises.The specific manifestation is that accounting investment protection can alleviate insufficient investment and restrict excessive investment;the ultimate controlling person's nature negatively regulates the relationship between the two;and in companies controlled by natural persons,the role of accounting investor protection to alleviate the underinvestment of enterprises is more obvious.Further considering the intermediary role of capital investment,it is found that for the entire sample,accounting investor protection restricts the degree of inefficiency of investment by inhibiting the company's long-term equity investment and fixed asset investment,and the intermediary effect of intangible assets fails to pass the significance test;From the perspective of different types of inefficient behavior,the intermediary role of long-term equity investment and fixed assets is more obvious in the overinvestment sample.From the perspective of the nature of the ultimate controller,the intermediary role of long-term equity investment and fixed asset investment is more obvious in enterprises controlled by natural persons.