Management Equity Incentive,Corporate Tax Avoidance And Corporate Value

Tax revenue,which is an important part of national fiscal revenue,is an important economic basis for the government to fulfill its functions.However,as an independent business entity,any increase in cost will be avoided as much as possible.Domestic and foreign scholars have long been concerned about the impact of corporate characteristics on the degree of corporate tax avoidance,but the equity incentives for corporate management are rarely involved.Under the internal corporate governance model in which modern corporate ownership—management rights are separated,the emergence of commission-agent issues provides new ideas for scholars to conduct in-depth research on corporate tax avoidance behavior and corporate value.The research conclusions of this paper can help companies make financial decisions and business decisions.It also has important reference significance for tax authorities to improve law enforcement efficiency and minimize national tax losses.This paper takes management stock option incentive as the starting point,and on the basis of reviewing the literature on management stock incentive,corporate tax avoidance,corporate value and their mutual relations,carries out theoretical analysis and puts forward empirical hypotheses for the relationship between the three,namely:management There is a negative correlation between stock-level incentives and corporate tax avoidance,and a negative correlation between corporate tax avoidance and corporate value.In companies with high equity incentives,corporate tax avoidance has a positive impact on corporate value.This paper takes the sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2012 to 2016 as a sample,and conducts empirical analysis and robustness test on the relationship between management incentives,corporate tax avoidance and corporate value.The results of the study show that,first,there is a negative correlation between equity incentives of management and the level of corporate tax avoidance.Management equity incentives can link managers' personal interests with the overall interests of the company and reduce the rent-seeking behavior of the management.Because of the positive relationship between management's rent-seeking behavior and the degree of corporate tax avoidance,management equity incentives can reduce corporate tax avoidance.The degree of excitement.Second,there is a negative correlation between corporate tax avoidance and corporate value.The cost and risk of tax avoidance,especially the management rent-seeking cost associated with corporate tax avoidance,make the cost of tax avoidance for enterprises far more than their benefits,and there is a negative correlation between corporate tax avoidance and corporate value.Third,in companies with high level of equity incentives by management,corporate tax avoidance behavior has a positive impact on corporate value.Managerial equity incentives can link management's own interests with the overall interests of the company,reduce the management's rent-seeking behavior,reduce the company's internal agency costs associated with corporate tax avoidance,make the company's tax avoidance gains greater than the tax avoidance costs,and increase corporate value.