Research On Control Of Major Shareholders,equity Incentives Of Executives And The Degree Of Corporate Tax Avoidance

Tax is the most important source of fiscal revenue of a country,and tax avoidance is a way to retain more profits in enterprises.More and more enterprises try to reduce their tax burden through tax avoidance,thus increasing the overall income of enterprises.With the continuous development and improvement of modern enterprise system,the phenomenon of separation of two rights becomes more and more common in enterprises.The principal-agent problem caused by this phenomenon is one of the key factors to be considered in the study of corporate tax avoidance.The problem of tax avoidance caused by this kind of nature has been paid more and more attention to by the public.As a relatively novel incentive method,equity incentive has a certain effect in alleviating the agency problem.Then what impact will such incentive mode have on the overall tax avoidance of enterprises?In order to understand its tax avoidance motive in essence,we introduce the major shareholder control variable,Based on the theory of principal-agent and incentive,this paper studies the role of major shareholders in the process of corporate tax avoidance.Based on the quantile empirical research method,this paper selects the corporate governance perspective to study the impact of the strong and weak control of major shareholders on the relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance under the condition of full distribution of tax avoidance.The empirical resu lts show that in private listed companies,executive equity incentive is negatively correlate.d with corporate tax avoidan ce.In enterprises with more aggressive tax avoida nce level,the negative correlation between equity incentive and corp.orate tax avoidance degree will gradually weaken.When the degree of co rporate tax avo idance is weak,the control of major shareholders will positively adjust the negative correlation between executive equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance.However,when the level of cor porate tax avoidance is aggressive,the major shareholder's control is negative to regulate the negative correlation between executive equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance.This paper takes the internal governa nce of enterprises as the fous of the research,and con ducts an in-depth study on the impact of equity inc entive on corp orate tax avoida nce under the full distribution o:f tax avoidance,providing more references for the relevant studies on executive equity incentive and corporate tax avoidance,as well as relevant theoretical basis for the allocation of corporate control rights.