A Research Of The Regulation Failure In The Chinese Tobacco Monopoly System Underthe Sight Of Region Competition

Tobacco tax is also an important part of China's fiscal revenue,especially for the local government.However,due to the responsibility as a signatory to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,China is obliged to include “tobacco control” as the ultimate objectives of the tobacco industry's long-term development.Under the current tobacco monopoly management system in China,although the tobacco tax remained high and stable,but “tobacco control” target failed to reach.This study argues that,underlying the tobacco market,which appears to be prosperous in the region,is the widely non-price competitive behavior.In which,regional markets access barriers are established to ensure the interests of the local tobacco sectors and the local government's tax benefits.This is the competition between the local governments or the tobacco sectors rather than the normal market competition.The “total volume control” system design is alienated in execution into “a constant total amount”,this situation finally leads to a long-term saturation of the tobacco consumption market,and a high level of sales scale status.Therefore,the tool of “total control” in tobacco monopoly system is suffering a distortion of function and implementation of aliasing in field practice,due to the interference from local and sectoral interests,which resulting in regulatory failure.This study argues that the policy,planning,and even policy of the tobacco monopoly system itself can not meet the basic needs of the “tobacco control” task.This paper analyzes the performance,causes and consequences of the failure of the tobacco monopoly system caused by this regional competition,and explores how the monopoly system is gradually deviating from the original design.And puts forward some suggestions on the reform of tobacco monopoly system from the perspective of taxation system reform and tobacco business model reform.