Research On Risk Control And Incentive Mechanism Of Inventory Finacing

The inventory pledge business effectively solved the problem of financing difficulties for SMEs.But in the process of implementation,various risk issues will arise.How to prevent possible risks and incentivize the logistics companies and SMEs are the focuses of this study.This article takes the inventory pledge financing business under the entrusted supervision and unified credit model as the research object,takes the related risk control measures and incentive mechanism decision-making in the financing business process as the goal,and uses principal-agent and game theory theories and methods in different modes.The participants' decision-making behaviors were studied to find out the prevention methods of the default risk and the moral hazard of SMEs as well as the incentive mechanism.The main contents of this paper are the following three points:1.For the entrusted supervision model,under the market-oriented loan interest rates,in order to prevent SMEs from breaching contracts and incentivize logistics companies,we established a principal-agent model based on incomplete information static game process.The analysis of equilibrium results show that loan interest rate and pledge rate are important risk control indicators;and the incentive mechanism for rewarding rewards based on profit-motivation coefficient for logistics companies can make them pay more efforts to improve the salvage value of pledge at the end of pledge period.2.In order to prevent the risk of adverse selection of logistics enterprises under the unified credit model,a signal game model based on incomplete information dynamic game was established.Research shows that when certain conditions are met and credit lines and margins are increased within a certain range,the two sides of the game can be separated and balanced.High-risk logistics companies will not accept the requirements for banks to increase margins,and banks also do not cooperate with high-risk logistics companies.This will effectively prevent banks from adverse selection risks.3.For the prevention of the moral hazard of SMEs under the unified credit model,and promoting the honest operation of SMEs,a dual incentive mechanism combining reputation value and honesty awards was designed.Using evolutionary game research methods,we analyze the game behavior between SMEs and logistics companies to obtain the conditions for the formation of different stable equilibrium points,and then summarize the control measures and methods for the moral hazard of SMEs.