Research On P2P Rural Financing Risk Control Based On Evolutionary Game

The rural economy is an important part of the Chinese economy,which is affected by the development of rural finance.The development of rural financing business of traditional financial institutions has been affected because of the regional and fragmented nature of rural areas.Its financing needs cannot be effectively met,which restricts the development of the economy.In this context,the P2 P platform has developed rapidly and expanded its business in rural financial markets.However,the development of the P2 P platform faces a variety of risk issues.Because of the small amount of rural financing,lack of effective collateral,unsound credit system and relatively short development time.Therefore,this thesis is of great significance for the risk control of P2 P rural financing.The thesis takes financing risk as the research object and analyzes the risk control problem of P2 P rural financing by using the evolutionary game method.Firstly,it analyzes development status,financing characteristics and financing mode of P2 P rural financing.It is mainly to find out the risk of P2 P rural financing,such as credit risk,reputation risk,policy risk,information asymmetry risk,etc.Secondly,it constructs the evolutionary game model of borrowing farmers and P2 P platform under the traditional financing mode.Meanwhile,it constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of borrowing farmers,core enterprises and P2 P platform under the rural supply chain financing mode.Finally,it analyzes the choice of strategy and the evolutionary stability strategy of financing entities under different financing modes.In order to verify the correctness of the above conclusions,it simulates the evolution trajectory,equilibrium state,and the influence of core parameters on the evolution trajectory by using numerical simulation methods.The thesis finds that the strategic choices of financing entities affect each other,and the strategic of either party are simultaneously restricted by other financing entity strategies.It has a great impact on the strategic choice of financing entities,such as financing amount,default cost,supervision cost,information disclosureintensity,positive and negative incentives,loss compensation,breach of contract punishment,etc.The default income of borrowing farmers has a strong inducing effect,but the penalty of breach of contract and the correlation between supply chain subjects have strong restrictions on default behavior;The cost of supervision has an important impact on the strategic choice of core enterprises and P2 P platforms.However,the default costs and positive incentives of core companies can enable core companies to choose a compliance strategy.Then,investors' trust in the platform has a positive effect on the compliance operation of P2 P platform.Meanwhile,the financing risk control strategy is less in the traditional financing mode,because the risk factors can be controlled,and the problem is serious information asymmetry.However,the interests of core enterprises and borrowing farmers under the supply chain financing model are interrelated,which increases the influencing factors of risk control and reduces the risk of financing.It proposes a risk control strategy recommendations based on the research conclusions.This thesis proposes risk control strategies from the perspective of P2 P platform,core enterprises,borrowing farmers and government,and provides a theoretical reference for the healthy development of P2 P rural financing business.