The Research On Relationship Of Dual-Class Shares Structure And Investment Efficiency

Dual-class share structure needs both cracked the firm’s founder,through equity financing in order to obtain funding for the development of the company,and always maintain its for control of the company’s dilemma,is the ownership structure in law and system innovation,has become the numerous well-known Internet companies preferred equity structure.But it is a special equity structure deviation from the our country joint-stock company "with right" the fair principle,at the same time,the absolute control of the company in order to keep the firm’s founder,will cause the separation of control rights and cash-flow rights.The separation of the right of control rights and cash-flow of the company will influence the investment behavior of management and the investment efficiency of the company.Investment decision is one of the three decisions of modern enterprise management,which is the starting point of financial decision.Investment activity is the main cause of the company growth and an important foundation for the future cash flow growth,directly affects the performance of the company,decide the enterprise future development direction,which determine the study of control and cash flow right under the separation of dual ownership structure impact on investment efficiency of listed companies is of great significance.This article first expounds the the related theories of dual-class share structure,control rights and cash-flow rights and the degree of separation,investment efficiency,and then analyzes the nasdaq-listed 28 dual-class share structure of the company’s present situation and characteristics,further study on dual-class share structure has influence mechanism to the investment efficiency,and puts forward the relevant hypothesis.Again to select data from2013-2016 as the research sample,set up dual-class share structure and investment efficiency of regression model,finally,the double investigates the relationship between ownership structure and efficiency of investment in the empirical analysis.Through the empirical analysis conclusions are as follows:(1)dual-class share structure of listed companies management major investment decisions on the company has absolute control,is not conducive to the other shareholders supervise the company’s investment decision-making,can reduce investment efficiency,caused by excessive investment.(2)concentration and separation of ownership and management control of efficiency is related to the level of investment and management control of the difference between cash-flow right,the higher proportion and control,based on private profit maximization and the greater the likelihood of excessive investment.On the contrary,the share of cash flow held by management is negatively correlated with the level of non-efficiency investment.(3)the asset-liability ratio of dual-class share structure listed companies is negatively correlated with the non-efficiency investment level,and the debt constraint has a certain inhibitory effect on the investment expenditure level of listed companies.The company size,growth opportunity and free cash flow are positively correlated with the level of non-efficiency investment.Research conclusion of this paper to the correct understanding and fully understand the dual-class share structure impact on investment efficiency provides the theory instruction,and on how to choose a more accurate model and is more suitable for variable indicators to measure the double investment efficiency of ownership structure of listed companies research prospects are put forward.