Soft Budget Constraint,Managerial Overconfidence And Financial Rent-seeking In State-owned Listed Companies

The financial rent-seeking problem in the State-owned listed companies has long been criticized by the public.The pain of distorted accounting information,debt risk and agency costs it caused have swept through the whole capital market,what path of financial rent-seeking "crack" should to follow? Accord with the special system background and the endowment difference of principle parts in market,budget soft constraint's “oxygen supply and blood transfusion” for “zombie enterprises” have led to property right advantage obstruction,and executives' excessive non-rationality further increased the risk of enterprise,which hinders the achievement of financial objective.In the deepening reform of State-owned listed companies,managerial overconfidence inhibition,budget constraints hardening have become the key to boost economic vitality,achieve total factor productivity,as well as break barriers for agency problem.Previous research on financial rent-seeking was attaching great importance to phenomenon description and internal governance while giving a contempt to empirical research as well as top design,let alone the parallel cross analysis between micro psychological behavior and macro institutional environment merely based on State-owned listed companies.Given all that,based on the state-owned enterprises in the field of supply side reform,following institutional barriers of property right — internal control quality of corporate — irrational decision making,this article investigates the harm,causes and governance of financial rent-seeking.Selecting A shares from 2010 to 2015 in Shanghai and Shenzhen of state-owned listed companies as sample,this paper mainly elaborates double factors of soft budget constraint and excessive confidence on the invasion mechanism of financial rent-seeking,and uses the multiple regression model to make empirical analysis and robustness test on the impact of the disaster causing factors.The main contribution of this paper is: to be a breakthrough in the research perspective,further analysis of the causes and governance of financial rent-seeking from institutional arrangement and psychological deviation in the research on the enlightenment of dimensions,to boost the capital market fairness,improve the efficiency of governance of state-owned enterprises,put forward some useful suggestions early to adapt to the new economic norm,and to realize the exploration and breakthrough concerning the theory and practice.The paper is divided into six chapters totally,the specific layout of the content is as follows:The first part mainly introduces the research motivation,literature review and research framework.The second chapter is about the basic theory and the related concepts.In the third chapter,the paper analyzes the relationship between the soft budget constraint,executive overconfidence and financial rent-seeking systemically.In the fourth chapter,multiple regression models are made to analyze the hypothesis and test the robustness.The fifth chapter,based on the reality of China's securities market and institutional background,puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.The last chapter is the conclusion of the full text of the study,and the innovation and shortcomings of the research and evaluation.