Research On Executives' Rent-seeking Income In The M&A Of State-owned Enterprises Under The Regulation Effect Of Managerial Power

In recent years,with the development of Chinese economy,the liquidity of capital market has been significantly enhanced,and the mergers and acquisitions of domestic listed companies have begun to develop in a large scale.To get rid of endogenous growth bottlenecks and expand business efficiency through mergers and acquisitions has become a good strategy for many enterprises to seek competitive advantage,occupy the market and achieve rational allocation of resources.In 2015,it is known as the merger year of enterprises.Whether giant central enterprises or emerging internet companies,mergers have become a keen choice of these enterprises.Mergers and acquisitions mostly seek a kind of synergistic effect.However,due to the inherent limitation of the state-owned property rights system and the deviation of the interests of the management and shareholders,the management will prefer the irrational M&A,which aims at its own interests,to produce “the paradox of success” in the merger and acquisition.In view of this,this paper selects the data of 2014-2016 year A share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples to test the rent-seeking income of senior executives in the merger and acquisition of state-owned enterprises,and to explore the motivation of frequent merger and acquisition by senior executives.Firstly,we review the related literature of mergers and acquisitions,rent-seeking income and management power at home and abroad.Based on previous studies,this paper makes a theoretical analysis of M&A,rent-seeking income and managerial power.Secondly,combined with the special development process of China's state-owned enterprises and the actual situation of mergers and acquisitions,we analyze the performance of M&A in state-owned enterprises.Based on this,we analyze the rent seeking income of executives in mergers and acquisitions,and explore the hidden motivations behind executives' frequent mergers and acquisitions.Through the construction of the regression model of state-owned enterprise merger and executive rent-seeking income,two aspects of explicit income and recessive income are tested to prove that M&A is positively related to rent-seeking income of senior executives.Again,based on the perspective of power rent-seeking,we introduce the comprehensive indicator of managerial power as regulated variable,placing the M&A,rent-seeking income and managerial power under the same research framework,and observing the regulatory role of managerial power in the relationship between the M&A of state-owned enterprises and the rent-seeking income of senior executives.Finally,based on the empirical analysis results,this paper proposes some suggestions on reducing the rent seeking opportunities and improving the quality and performance of the merger and acquisition.