Study On Principle-agent Of Role Overlapping Scenario In PPP Projects

PPP(Public-Private-Partnership)has achieved the unprecedentedly rapid development under the guidance of policies since 2014,when the model started to be promoted by government.However,when promoting PPP projects,the government only focuses on the project preliminary implementation,but neglects the status of long-term operation in the future.Thus,the relatively high uncertainty exists in the such projects.At present,the bad phenomenon that “value construction,underrate operation” broadly exists in lots of PPP projects.In this paper,the author proposes that it is the complex income system due to some specialized companies(e.g.operators and construction contractors)start to have both short-term service contracts income and long-term operation income when they become the shareholders of project company that causes the uncertain influence on their behavior.Thus,in this paper,based on the principle of principal-agent theory,the author analyzes the mechanism of this phenomenon and how to formulate effective incentive measures for the government in terms of internal company participants' relationship and the characteristics of construction and operation period of the project.Firstly,having considered the reality,the author builds a double-layer principle-agent model including government,investors,and dual-role party with equity ratios to quantitatively analyze the dual-role party ' s effort level and the incentive system of government according to the roles overlapping phenomenon between “Investors-Operators”and “Investors-Contractors”.It is found that the dual-role party would be encouraged to improve their effort level of both social benefit and economic benefit when operators or contractors become the investors in the company of PPP projects.In addition,the government could decrease the incentives during construction,increase the incentive supervision level during operation and guide investors to form a double supervision on the specialized companies by increasing the dual-role party's equity ratio to finally decrease the risk of opportunistic and then enhance the overall benefit.Besides,for the situation where private investors are concurrently contractors and operators of the project,the two-stage dynamic principal-agent model is constructed according to the different characteristics of parties involved in the construction period andthe operation period.This paper also analyzes the effort level of private investors and the different incentive systems of the government in two phases.It is found that,attention should be paid to the incentive and supervision of the operation period for the current phenomenon of “emphasizing construction and ignoring operations”,which can not only enhance the effort level of the private parties in the operation period,but also can significantly enhance their efforts during the construction period.During the construction period,more attention should be paid to the professional level and financial capability of the participants.The stronger the private investors,the less likely the speculation is to happen;meanwhile,during the construction period,participants are more likely to promote the effort level when the importance of future benefits been identified.